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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Questar Pipeline Company, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 900592 
OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY 
Petitioner Questar Pipeline Company respectfully submits its initial brief in 
support of its petition for review of a decision of the Utah State Tax Commission, 
issued December 30, 1990. 
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS 
Statement of Jurisdiction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 (1989) and 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1990). 
Statement of Issue and Standard of Review. 
The issue for review is whether the Utah Tax Commission has properly 
determined Questar's 1988 property-tax valuation in light of the stipulated facts, 
the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing held by the Tax Commission, appli-
cable agency precedent, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), and 
interpretative case law. 
The standard for review of Tax Commission decisions is the UAPA, which 
provides, in part: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis 
of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) The agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court; 
(h) The agency action is: 
(i) An abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; . . . (iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsisten-
cies; or (iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.1 
Determinative Statutes, Ordinances and Rules. 
With respect to the issues that are in dispute, this case appears to be one of 
first impression for this Court. Thus, the determinative law that applies is the 
UAPA, quoted in the prior section. 
xUtah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(4)(g) and (h) (1989). 
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Statement of the Case. 
Nature of the Case. Questar is an interstate natural gas pipeline company, 
virtually all of whose facilities and operations, including its rates and charges, are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
The Company operates integrated transportation, storage and related facilities in 
Wyoming, Colorado and several counties in Utah. It is accordingly subject to the 
provisions of Part 2 of Chapter 2 of Title 59 of the Utah Code, requiring the 
central assessment of its properties by the Tax Commission for the purposes of 
determining Questar's property taxes.2 
This case has arisen out of a dispute over the proper assessment of the fair 
market value of Questar's system for the tax year 1988. Although some elements 
of the final determination of Questar's tax assessment were stipulated, Questar 
believes the final appraised value of its property was unlawfully determined. 
Course of the Proceedings. In April 1988, the Commission, through its 
Property Tax Division,3 issued a preliminary assessment of $300,000,000 as the 
fair market value of Questar for the tax year 1988. Subsequently, the Division 
materially modified various elements in the underlying calculations and then issued 
its official assessment on April 29, 1988—still at $300,000,000. Questar paid its 
assessed property taxes under protest and sought a redetermination of its assess-
2Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-201 through -217 (1987 & Supp. 1990). 
3See note 9, infra. 
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ment on May 31, 1988. (R. 398-401.) 
Prior to the hearing and after the parties had engaged in discovery, the 
Property Tax Division (the Division) and Questar narrowed the issues by stipulat-
ing to the validity of certain formal calculations. (R. 380-81.) The proceeding 
was thus reduced to a dispute concerning the appropriate "correlation" or weight-
ing of three separate estimation methods to obtain a proper determination of the 
fair market value of Questar (as appropriately adjusted for statutory deductions 
such as intangible property and inventory). 
An evidentiary hearing was held on March 26, 1990, at which Questar and 
the Division presented expert witnesses to discuss the appropriate way in which to 
utilize the stipulated facts. The hearing was held before two of the four Tax 
Commissioners and a hearing officer designated by the Commission. Oral argu-
ment was conducted before this panel on April 4, 1990, and the issue was submit-
ted without written briefs. Questar's position was that the most reliable estimate 
of its fair market value, in light of the stipulated facts and calculations, was be-
tween $221 and $236 million. The Property Tax Division's position was, notwith-
standing that the stipulated facts and calculations were different from those at the 
outset of the proceedings, the fair market value of Questar was still $300 million. 
Disposition. The Tax Commission issued its final decision on December 3, 
1990 (the December decision), finding that "the correlated value is $296,000,-
000." Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 (1989) and 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) 
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(Supp. 1990), Questar sought this Court's review of that order. 
Statement of Facts. 
Questar is an interstate pipeline whose operations extend into Colorado, 
Wyoming and several counties in Utah. Virtually all aspects of its operations are 
subject to the rate regulation of the FERC (R. 29, 54, 202), and its rates are set 
by the FERC on the basis of a reasonable return on its depreciated, original-cost 
"rate base." The rate base is the investment on which the owners of the company 
may earn a rate of return that is competitive with returns on similar investments. 
(R. 89-91.) The investment base is determined, with some adjustments, to be the 
original cost of the properties, less the accumulated depreciation.4 It is, with 
minor differences, equivalent to the "cost method" for estimating a company's 
value. (R. 31.) 
On the lien date of January 1, 1988, Questar was a second-tier subsidiary 
of Questar Corporation, a Utah corporation whose common stock is publicly 
traded. (R. 27.) By nearly all measures, Questar constitutes a minority of the 
size of its parent corporation, Questar Corporation: Questar's plant and equip-
ment are approximately 29 % of that of the consolidated parent, its gross revenues 
4
 [R]ate base . . . starts out with a net plant of a company such as 
Questar Pipeline, net plant being the gross plant minus accumulated 
depreciation. There are adjustments made to net plant to come up 
with rate base. Those adjustments include such items a prepayments, 
working capital, and a deduction for deferred federal income taxes. 
(R. 30, testimony of Morris J. Jackson. See also R. 43 and R. 247 [Ex, 2].) 
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are 33% of the parent, and its payroll is 20% of the total corporate payroll. (Id.) 
Operations conducted through Questar Corporation's other subsidiaries include 
local natural gas distribution (Mountain Fuel Supply Company), oil-and-gas devel-
opment and production (Wexpro Company), oil-and-gas exploration and develop-
ment (Celsius Energy Company and Universal Resources Corporation), brick 
manufacturing and retailing (Interstate Brick Company), and telecommunications 
and computer services (Questar Service Company). (R. 28 and Exhibit 12.)5 
On or about April 7, 1988, the Property Tax Division submitted its prelimi-
nary assessment to Questar. This assessment indicated a systemwide appraisal of 
$300 million.6 (R. 31, R. 245 [Ex. 1].) Accompanying this assessment were 
calculations for the cost method ($219 million), the income method ($300 mil-
lion), and the stock-and-debt method ($362 million).7 There was no indication of 
what weight was attributed to each value in arriving at a single appraisal. 
After discussions between Questar and the Property Tax Division, several 
5Exhibit 12 was Questar's 1987 Annual Report to Shareholders. (R. 233.) It 
was not included in the record originally transmitted to the Court, but will be 
submitted by stipulation shortly after this brief is filed. 
6Because the parties stipulated to the methodology for determining the Utah 
portion of the pipeline's FMV, the discussion throughout this brief will refer only 
to the total value of Questar's multi-state system. 
7The cost method, described above, is based primarily on the depreciated, 
original-cost rate base used by the FERC for rate-making; the income method is 
intended to evaluate the company on the basis of its net income; the stock-and-
debt (or "market") method considers value based on outstanding common stock 
value and the company's total debt commitment. 
-6-
adjustments to the calculations for the three methods were made, yielding $210 
million for the cost method (down $9 million), $303 million for income (up $3 
million), and $340 million for stock-and-debt (down $22 million). Notwithstand-
ing the changes in the individual estimates, the "official" assessment issued on 
April 29, 1988, was unchanged at $300 million.8 (Id.) 
Later, the Property Tax Division responded to a Questar interrogatory 
seeking the workpapers and backup schedules for its official evaluation and indi-
cated it had made an overall assessment of $292 million, derived from $220 
million for the cost method, $310 million for income, $312 million for stock-and-
debt ($220/310/312 = $292 million.) (R. 31-32, R. 245 [Ex. 1], R. 318 
[Ex. 9].) 
The final values—$210/303/312 millions, respectively—were stipulated to 
by the parties prior to the commencement of the hearings. Without agreeing to 
any particular calculation method or the importance, viability, reliability or funda-
mental applicability of the methods, the parties agreed that they would not contest 
the underlying calculations of the three methods. (R. 380-81.) 
Because this case centers around the appropriate weighting of the three values 
obtained from the cost, income and stock-and-debt methods, this brief will refer to 
them in that order at various times. Thus, the preliminary assessment of April 7, 
1988, is characterized by the notation 219/300/362 = $300 million and the 
official assessment issued on April 29, 1988, is represented by 210/303/340 = 
$300 million. 
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Summary of the Argument. 
The Commission's determination of the fair market value of Questar for 
1988 is unlawful for several reasons: 
(a) The Commission provides little or no indication of its derivation of the 
final assessment, a result that does not meet the standards of Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act as interpreted by First National Bank of Boston v. County Board 
of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). There is no roadmap or rational 
explanation by the Commission to indicate how it weighted the three stipulated 
estimates to arrive at a final assessment. 
(b) In its apparent rejection of the cost /rate-base method for measuring the 
fair market value of Questar, the agency's action is contrary to any reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence and is therefore unlawful as not being supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. 
(c) In refusing to apply its prior practice with respect to the stock-and-debt 
method, as articulated in Northwest Pipeline Corporation v. Property Tax Divi-
sion, Case Nos. 85-0074 and 86-0255 (Utah Tax Comm'n, Dec. 21, 1987), the 
Commission's action is discriminatory and unlawful under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (1989). 
(d) In declaring the income method the "most reliable," the Commission 
totally ignored the unrefuted demonstration that this method, as applied in this 
case, is equivalent to the stock-and-debt method. 
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(e) To the extent that the Tax Commission's Property Tax Division9 con-
ducted a "moving target" exercise in which the taxpayer never knew the position 
or the rationale behind the position concerning the 1988 assessment, the Commis-
sion has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, contrary to the UAPA. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The objective in this case was to determine the "fair market value" (FMV) 
of the subject property, as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(2) 
(1987) on January 1, 1988:10 
"Fair market value" means the amount at which property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reason-
able knowledge of the relevant facts. 
As a practical matter, there are no willing buyers and sellers that would directly 
9The Utah Code does not identify the "Property Tax Division" as a legal 
entity separate from the Tax Commission. The Division is merely an operating 
group within the Tax Commission, and there is no legal distinction between the 
two. Accordingly, actions taken by the Division are those of the Commission and 
subject to the same standards of scrutiny on review. For example, proceedings 
that style the Property Tax Division as a party to the determination (see R. 392) 
do not involve an adjudication of the position of the Property Tax Division by an 
independent tribunal. Indeed, there appears to be no distinction between the two, 
as the record submitted by the Tax Commission contains settlement documents 
that were exchanged between Questar and the Property Tax Division (R. 395-96) 
and presumably not to be made available to the Commission itself. 
10Subsequent amendment by the Legislature changed the designation of § 59-2-
102(6) and added the qualification "and includes the adjustment for intangibles 
under section 59-2-304 
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satisfy the definition of § 59-2-102(2). Because there are few or no comparable 
sales of properties that would provide a direct reading of the FMV of large, multi-
state, rate-regulated entities such as Questar, as well as utilities, railroads, electric 
transmission companies and other multi-county businesses, it is necessary to use 
surrogate measures to determine the FMV. 
In the case before the Court, the parties stipulated that the FMV of 
Questar's multi-state system would be some combination (or "correlation") of the 
stipulated values for three commonly used surrogate measures of value: the cost 
method, the income method, and the stock-and-debt (or market) method.11 The 
parties agreed not to argue about the actual computations used to obtain these 
three measures (although they didn't necessarily agree with one another), but 
agreed to disagree on the relative strength, weakness, reliability, and applicability 
of the methods. Thus, the disagreement was focused on the proper weighting to 
be assigned to each of the three methods in arriving at a single estimate of the 
FMV of Questar. In this context, the issue before the Court concerns the weight-
nThe process of synthesizing a single value from the three separate measures 
available is often referred to as "correlation." This term is not the same as the 
statistical concept of correlation, which was one of the elements of the testimony 
of Professor Hal B. Heaton. (See R. 68.) Therefore, in accord with the general 
usage at the hearing, the process of arriving at a single value from the three 
separate methods will be referred to as "weighting" or "reconciliation." "Corre-
lation" will be used to refer the statistical process of studying whether one or 
more variable quantities is statistically related, or "correlated," to other variable 
quantities. 
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ing that was given to the three methods by the Tax Commission. Clearly, the Tax 
Commission must have prescribed—either explicitly or implicitly—some relative 
weight to the three components in order or arrive at a composite result of $296 
million. Thus, the questions are: Can we discern the relative weighting used by 
the Commission and, if so, is it compatible with the evidence, the Commission's 
prior practice, and with reasoned decision-making under the UAPA? 
I. THE COMMISSION HAS PROVIDED NO 
INDICATION OF HOW IT ARRIVED AT ITS 
FINAL ASSESSMENT OF $296 MILLION. 
In another case involving the State Tax Commission, this Court previously 
found: "Nothing in the record indicates how the Tax Commission arrived at the 
figures." First National, 799 P.2d at 1165. This statement could have been 
written to apply to the Commission's December 3 decision in this case. Although 
the decision dedicates two paragraphs that ostensibly support its conclusion that 
the FMV of Questar's system is $296 million, a closer look shows that there is no 
indication of the derivation of this number, nor any connection of this final num-
ber to the specific facts in the record. As will be discussed in Parts II-V of this 
argument, the position of the Property Tax Division was that the evaluation should 
be $300 million, notwithstanding that this recommendation did not correspond in 
any logical way with the underlying, stipulated values for the three evaluation 
methods used for the Company's property. Questar's evidence, on the other hand, 
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supported a FMV evaluation in the range of $231 million. (R. 93.) 
The Commission's result doesn't correspond to any witness's recommenda-
tion nor to either party's position. The discussion on page 4 of the December 3 
decision states only broad, general conclusions that (1) give the taxpayer or a 
reviewing court no logical pathway from the evidence presented to the conclusions 
reached, and (2) do not, in material respects, comport with the evidence. 
Paragraph 8 of the "Findings of Fact" of the Commission's December 3 
Decision provides the only analysis of the evidence:12 
The Tax Commission finds that in a case such as this, the 
market and income approaches to value are more reflective of actual 
market conditions than is the cost approach to value. This is because 
the cost approach is generally considered in the appraisal profession 
as a reliable indicator of value only when sufficient data and condi-
tions are not present for the other two approaches. In this case, 
there is a more than sufficient amount of data to support a valuation 
based upon the market and income approaches. While the cost 
approach may appear to some, in a strict mathematical sense, to be 
more technically correct, it does not necessarily follow that that 
approach is also the most reflective of actual market conditions. 
Market values do not always conform to precise mathematical formu-
lations. 
This "analysis" consists only of conclusory statements that are either circu-
lar or not found in the record. In particular, the Commission's primary conclu-
sion appears to be based on the statement that "[T]he cost approach is generally 
considered in the appraisal profession as a reliable indicator of the value only 
12Paragraph 2 of the "Conclusions of Law" provides the only other analysis; it 
is discussed in Part IV. 
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when sufficient data and conditions are not present for the other two approaches." 
There is no record evidence to support any claim about "the appraisal profession," 
much less this specific conclusion. No witness testified to such a conclusion. 
But, more importantly, it does not address the fundamentals of the various ap-
proaches. That is, it does not in any way dispose of the indisputable facts sur-
rounding the limitations placed on Questar by the imposition of FERC-determined 
rates that are based on providing a reasonable return on the basis of depreciated 
original costs—the cost method. 
To fail to address this foundational matter is not reliance on "relevant 
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." 
First National, 799 P. 2d at 1165. It is true that the Property Tax Division spon-
sored witnesses that claimed that the cost indicator should not be weighted very 
heavily (in one instance, that it and the income method should not be considered at 
all), but this does not end the inquiry. Questar understands that it must "marshall 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting 
facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 
776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 1989). But a fair evaluation of the evidence, as it relates 
to the cost method, shows that all witnesses recognize that a prospective buyer of 
a rate-regulated company such as Questar would be mindful of and affected by the 
rate limitations placed on the company by such an agency. (R. 140, 206-08, 230). 
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The direct analysis of the treatment of the cost method will be addressed in 
detail in Part II of this brief, and it will show that, not only did the Commission 
fail to provide any roadmap that led to its conclusion of $296 million, this result 
cannot be reconciled with the facts facing a rate-regulated company such as 
Questar. 
Further, to suggest that "there is more than a sufficient amount of data to 
support an evaluation based on the market and income approaches" is a conclusion 
that is devoid of any substantive analysis. First, no witness so testified. Second, 
the amount of data is not relevant; what is relevant is the quality of the data. And 
the evidence, when the record is viewed as a whole, does not permit the conclu-
sion that the market and income approaches are more reliable or more likely to 
measure the FMV of the company—no matter how much data there is. 
The Commission also offers the logic that, even if the cost/rate-base ap-
proach is "in a strict mathematical sense, [ ] more technically correct," it still can 
reject the cost method because "it does not necessarily follow that that approach is 
also the most reflective of actual market conditions." The Commission attempts 
to parlay this somewhat irrelevant conclusion into the converse, which does not 
follow—namely, that the cost approach does not reflect actual market conditions. 
Indeed, the overwhelming evidence is that a knowledgeable, potential buyer will 
be highly aware of the basis upon which the FERC determines the rates that 
determine the pipeline's cash flow or income stream—that is, the depreciated 
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original cost or rate base. (R. 89-91, 207-08, 229, 235-36.) The Commission's 
implication that an attempt to analyze the problem that faces an appraiser by 
mathematical methods automatically produces inaccurate or inapplicable results is 
simply not reasonable. 
Finally, the Commission's statement in paragraph 9 that "stock and debt 
approach tests the reliability of the other two approaches" is completely devoid of 
any record support. No witness addressed this point, and there is no evidence to 
support it. The goal is to measure Questar's FMV, and methods must be used or 
rejected, in whole or in part, on their merits. The Commission's conclusion does 
not pass the test of the UAPA and First National}3 For these reasons, as well 
as the more detailed examination of the Commission's rejection of the cost method 
discussed in Part II below, the Commission's December 3 decision does not 
comport with the UAPA and its interpretation under the Grace Drilling and First 
National cases. 
13In addition, the stipulation precluded the parties from advancing this if-two-
results-are-close-they-must-be-right argument: "[N]either party will advance any 
argument . . . that emphasizes or relies on the relative difference between the 
income and stock-and-debt methods to imply or conclude that the cost method is 
inferior or superior . . . ." (R. 381, f 1(c).) 
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II. THE COMMISSION'S APPARENT REJECTION14 
OF THE COST METHOD FOR DETERMINING 
FAIR MARKET VALUE IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN VIEWED 
IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD. 
The Commission has relegated the cost method to a minimal (or non-exis-
tent) role in the determination of Questar's FMV. Other than indicating that "the 
cost approach is generally considered in the appraisal profession as a reliable 
indicator of value only when sufficient data and conditions are not present for the 
other two approaches," the Commission did not address the merits of the cosi 
method in the context of the facts of the case. First, the record does not suppor 
this conclusion—no witness testified about what is "generally considered in the 
appraisal profession." Second, the implication that "sufficient data and condi 
tions" are "present for the other two approaches" does not establish any defensible 
rationale for ignoring the cost method. The naked proclamation of conclusion* 
does not entitle an agency to the deference that might be accorded to specia 
expertise. See, e.g., Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, No. 89-1785 (D.C 
Cir., Mar. 5, 1991) (1991 WestLaw 26684).15 Here the UAPA requires more 
One of the difficulties with this argument from the outset is the lack o; 
explanation for the Commission's finding of a $296 million valuation. Thus 
Questar is reduced for some of its arguments to characterizing the Commission'* 
actions as "apparent," because the Commission's final decision does not articulate 
the Commission's derivation. See Part I, supra. 
15
"[T]he notion of lawfulness requires insistence that the chosen frameworl 
not collapse in practice into a standardless exercise of Commission discretioi 
resting on no more than an assertion of 'expertise'." Tennessee Gas, slip op. a 
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than a two-paragraph disposition that does little more than state conclusions that, 
at in material part, do not conform to evidence. 
As in the First National case, "nothing in the record indicates how the Tax 
Commission arrived at the figures" for its final evaluation. 799 P.2d at 1165. As 
discussed in Part I above, this shortcoming, almost per se, renders the Tax Com-
mission's decision to be incompatible with § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
But the Commission's shortcoming is more substantive than a simple failure 
to assign weights directly to the three methods and provide a rationale for the 
choice. The brief discussion of findings in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the December 3 
order do not reasonably reflect the evidence when viewed as a whole. Questar 
does not claim that no witness testified that the cost method should be assigned 
little or no weight, but a rational consideration of the evidence taken as a whole 
would not permit a reasonable person with knowledge of the field to draw the 
Commission's conclusions. 
In order to evaluate the Commission's treatment of the cost method under 
the standard of the UAPA, it is necessary to review the evidence in some detail. 
It was undisputed that Questar's revenues are totally determined by the rates and 
charges established by the FERC. (R. 29, 138.) Further, it is fundamental law 
that these rates and charges are based on the premise that a rate-regulated compa-
6, citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-52 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970). 
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ny is entitled to a return on its investment base that is commensurate with returns 
on investments of comparable risks and sufficient to maintain credit and attract 
necessary capital. F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Blue-
field Water Works & Improvement Co. v. PSC, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923)16; 
see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. PSC, 152 P.2d 542, 568 (Utah 1944). The 
amount on which an investor is entitled to earn a reasonable return is the rate 
base, which is, with minor adjustment, the same as the result produced by the cost 
method in this proceeding. (R. 30-31, see also 165.) 
Therefore, the owner or purchaser of Questar is constrained to an income 
that is designed to produce a fair rate of return on the investment value deter-
mined by the cost method used in property-tax evaluation. (R. 89-91.) In other 
words, a willing buyer of Questar would need to be content with the expectation 
that he will receive a net-income stream that produces a reasonable return based 
on the rate base—the value determined by the cost method. 
One demonstrative way to look at this as to assume for a moment that the 
cost/rate-base method for a rate-regulated company such as Questar is $200 
million and that the agency regulating its rates has permitted an overall rate of 
16The age of these cases makes them no less authoritative. They continue to 
form the foundation for nearly any analysis of the lawfulness of the return compo-
nent of utility-type ratemaking. 
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return of 10%,17 which, by law, would be comparable to overall returns avail-
able on other investments of similar risk. This would produce an annual return of 
$20 million to the owner. If, on the other hand, it is claimed that the "fair market 
value" of the property is $300 million, a hypothetical purchaser at this price 
would still be constrained by the rate-regulation agency to charge rates that would 
produce $20 million; thus, the purchaser's rate of return would be 
$300 -s- $20 = 6.67%. It is hard to see why any potential, rational investor 
would make such a commitment. If he can obtain an average return of 10% on an 
investment of comparable risk (as required by Hope and Bluefield), then he would 
be foolish to buy this company to obtain 6.67%. Yet, that is the behavior attribut-
ed to the potential "willing buyer . . . having reasonable knowledge of the rele-
vant facts" by the Commission's rejection of the cost method and acceptance of 
methods that yield a much higher valuation. 
The Commission's likely response is to claim that this demonstration is 
mere opinion and that there was contrary opinion expressed by other witnesses at 
the hearing. But it is not enough that there is a contrary opinion expressed. The 
UAPA requires that the record as a whole be considered, and the Commission 
provides no rational explanation why the FMV would be 41% above the rate-
The "weighted cost of capital," taking into account debt, preferred stock and 
common stock. See R. 247 [Ex. 2] and Mr. Darrell Hanson's explanation of this 
concept at R. 43-44, 54-59, 248 [Ex. 3]. 
-19-
base/cost method [($296 - $210) + $210 = 41%], when the buyer is limited to 
income available from depreciated original-cost rate-base regulation by the 
FERC.18 
To conclude that Questar's FMV is significantly more than its rate base is 
to directly presume that something else would compensate a purchaser for the 
shortfall in regulated return if he were to pay more than the rate base on which 
the pipeline is entitled to earn a return. No evidence of this kind was presented. 
In the absence of such evidence, there must be far greater weight placed on the 
cost/rate-base method for determining Questar's FMV.19 
Several courts have considered this question in detail and, under conditions 
that are very close to the ones before the Court in this case, have found that 
rejection of the evidence supporting a cost/rate-base methcxi is not reasonable 
under standards similar to those in the UAPA. 
This issue has been carefully analyzed by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in Boston Edison Co. v. Board of Assessors, 439 N.E. 2d 763, 387 
18Mr. Hanson, a manager with the Division of Public Utilities of the Utah 
Department of Commerce, gave a detailed explanation of the process used by the 
FERC to determine the rates that Questar can charge for its services and thereby 
produce an income stream. (R. 42-59.) 
19Indeed, one of the Property Tax Division's witness's put his finger right on 
the reason that the regulator's (FERC's) valuation is so nearly dispositive of the 
FMV: "[I]n the regulated market, the regulator's goal is to take [the] place of the 
marketplace with respect to a monopoly." (R. 235, testimony of Michael W. 
Goodwin.) 
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Mass. 298 (1982). Although the methodology "competing" with the cost/rate-
base method was different from the ones here, the question was the same: 
u[W]hether in determining the fair cash value20 of the property, the board's de-
cision to grant almost complete weight to the depreciated reproduction cost of 
Edison's property is supported on the record." Id. at 766. The Massachusetts 
court found the assessors' assignment of 5% weight to cost the rate-base method 
wasn't supported by the record and that: 
[T]he board did not indicate a reasonable basis in logic for ignoring 
almost entirely the fact that a potential buyer, if it were a public 
utility, would be considerably influenced by the return to which it 
would be limited on whatever investment it made. If property is 
known to be subject to . . . a governmentally-imposed restriction 
affecting its value or its earning power, that fact should be consid-
ered in any determination of its fair cash value. 
Id. at 767 (emphasis added). 
The Massachusetts court could see no reason why a willing buyer would 
purchase property on which it could expect to obtain an annual return well below 
that available on other similar investments—5.2% versus 9.5%. Id. at 768 and 
765 n.4. The analogous consideration in this case would be to compare the rate 
of return available on the agreed-on rate base of $210 million with the rate that 
would be obtained from the same income on an investment base of $296 million, a 
20The Massachusetts court defined this term as "the price that an owner 
willing but not compelled to sell ought to receive from one willing but not com-
pelled to buy." Id. at 766. This is equivalent to Utah's FMV. 
-21-
difference of almost 41 %. 
No less applicable to Questar's case is the Boston Edison conclusion: "As 
long as the standard to be applied is fair cash value, however, the record must 
show why a willing buyer would reasonably be expected to pay the value placed 
on the property by the board." Id. at 769. In Questar's case, there is no evi-
dence to show why a buyer would value the property 41% above what would 
otherwise produce a competitive rate of return on his investment. The undisputed 
evidence is that an investor is constrained to the returns obtained from the rates 
set by the FERC—rates that are determined by the company's rate base. 
It is also important to note that, as a general matter of law, rate-regulated 
facilities that are bought by another company will not be allowed to valued for 
rate purposes at an amount greater than the original depreciated cost rate base, 
even though a higher price may have been paid in the marketplace. See, e.g., 
Montana Power Co. v. FERC, 599 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1979) (no increase in rate 
base allowed upon transfer in order to prevent consumers from paying twice for 
the same asset). 
The words of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court could apply just as 
well to the proceeding before this Court: 
21To obtain some perspective, a 10% overall return on Questar's rate base is 
conservative and would produce $21 million in return on $210 million, but if this 
return is compared with the Commission's valuation of $296 million, the rate of 
return would only be 7.1 %. 
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Although the Board [Tax Commission] acknowledges that a public 
utility buyer of Edison's [Questar's] property would be limited to a 
fair return on Edison's [Questar's] net book cost, it nowhere ex-
plains, by references to substantial evidence or to reasoned principle, 
why a buyer would want to pay more than Edison's [Questar's] net 
book value, when by investing the same dollars elsewhere that buyer 
could obtain a better return. 
Boston Edison, 439 N.E.2d at 768; see also Montaup Electric Co. v. Board of 
Assessors, 460 N.E.2d 583 (Mass. 1984) (taxing board had disregarded credible 
evidence of rate base value); State ex rel. Wisconsin River Power Co. v. Board of 
Review, 370 N.W. 2d 580 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (board had insufficient evidence 
that a buyer could reasonably be expected to pay more than FERC rate base). 
The Massachusetts court went on to summarize: "[T]he record must show 
why a willing buyer would reasonably be expected to pay the value placed on the 
property by the Board. The record in this case does not do so." 439 N.E.2d at 
769. So, too, for the case before this Court. 
Another comprehensive discussion of a similar situation is found in a 
California trial-court case, which, although clearly not precedential or binding on 
this Court, provides a thoughtful, independent judicial analysis of the problem. In 
AT&T Communications of California v. State Board of Equalization, No. 500802 
(Cal. Super. Ct., Co. of Sacramento, Dept. 24, Feb. 1, 1991), slip op. at 10, the 
trial judge found: 
Rate base is a measure of what the regulators deem to be the capital 
at work. . . . The purchaser of regulated utility property must live 
in the same regulatory environment and would expect to earn only 
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the same return on rate base. Since the purchaser of utility property 
must be presumed to have other investment opportunities available to 
him, it would not be logical to assume that a purchaser would accept 
a lower return by buying utility property at a price higher than rate 
base when higher returns would be available elsewhere.22 
Questar does not take the view that the cost/rate-base method is, by itself, 
dispositive of the appraisal, nor that the rate base "caps" the value that can be 
used to assess property taxes. Rather, the evidence concerning the applicability 
and reliability of the methods must be reasonably analyzed to yield a result that is 
supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. 
The Company engaged an expert consultant, Prof. Hal B. Heaton, then a 
visiting professor at Harvard Business School, to analyze the problem and deter-
mine appropriate weights to be given to the methods, taking into account that the 
Company is rate-regulated by the FERC on the basis of the depreciated original-
cost rate base. 
Prof. Heaton conducted an analytic investigation of the information that was 
available in this case. His analysis, as set forth in Exhibit 5 (R. 253-64), provides 
a firm foundation to an otherwise subjective area. In particular, his attempt to 
find the most reliable estimate of FMV by evaluating the relative reliability of the 
three individual methods did not eliminate the non-cost methods, but did relegate 
them to a lesser role—not by subjective, standardless judgment, but by an analytic 
A copy of this case has been attached as Addendum B to the brief. 
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approach that recognized, among other things, the rate-regulation process conduct-
ed by the FERC. (R. 90, 117.) 
In sum, even when the evidence supporting the Commission's result is 
marshalled, it is hard to see that a reasonable mind would ignore, or relegate to 
such minimal significance, the constraining financial effects of operating under 
FERC rate regulation. Yet, that is the effect of the Commission's final determina-
tion. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S LEVEL OF RELIANCE ON THE 
STOCK-AND-DEBT METHOD IS NOT A RATIONAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY 
TO THE COMMISSION'S PRIOR POLICY IN NORTHWEST 
PIPELINE CORP. V. PROPERTY TAX DIVISION. 
The stock-and-debt method is founded on the theory that a company whose 
common equity securities are publicly traded can be evaluated by combining the 
open-market value of publicly traded equity securities with the value of the out-
standing debt of the company. Questar does not necessarily dispute that this meth-
od may have some application if the underlying assumptions are satisfied—name-
ly, that the equity securities of the company whose property is to be assessed are 
publicly traded. However, in this case, there is no dispute that Questar (1) is a 
second-tier subsidiary of a publicly traded company, (2) has no publicly traded 
equity securities of its own, and (3) constitutes a minority part of a diversified 
corporate family. 
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Accordingly, any attempt to ascribe a value to Questar through the stock-
and-debt method will necessarily require an allocation or attribution from the 
publicly-traded corporate parent or estimates of other "comparable" companies. 
There was extensive evidence indicating that Questar Pipeline forms a 
minority portion of Questar Corporation and that there is no agreed-on method for 
allocating a portion of the stock-and-debt value of the parent to the pipeline com-
pany. Attempts to determine the percentage of the parent that the pipeline opera-
tions account for produced an indisputably wide range of results, as indicated by 
Mr. Jackson, Prof. Heaton and Mr. Prawitt. (R. 27-28, 103-04, 199-200.) For 
example, if the corporate value is assumed to be $621,341,000,23 attempts to 
value the pipeline subsidiary range from $189 million to $317 million, depending 
on what financial index is used. (R. 260, R 86.) As Prof. Heaton pointed out, 
this suggests a very low level of reliability of this method. (R. 70-72.) 
In addition to its attempt to determine the pipeline's value as a percentage 
of its parent, the Property Tax Division also used so-called "comparables." 
(R. 88.) These are companies that are presumably similar to Questar through one 
or more economic or financial indices, and their value is ascribed in some way to 
that of Questar. Prof. Heaton observed that, because they rely on characteristics 
23This value is not explicitly stated in the evidence; it is implicit in Prof. 
Heaton's discussion of the Property Tax Division's attempt to allocation a portion 
of the corporate parent to the pipeline company. (R. 260.) E.g., $188,825,681 
- 30.39% = $621,341,497. 
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of other, diversified companies, such methods also have high variability and are 
relatively unreliable as indicators of the direct market value of Questar. (R. 86-
87.) Thus, there are major difficulties in finding a logical or rational chain from 
the value of the parent to that of a minority second-tier subsidiary. Even Division 
witness Hanke, who espoused 100% reliance on the stock-and-debt method, 
admitted that it "should be relied upon in making valuations whenever the stock 
and debt is actively tradefd]." (R. 128, emphasis added.) This condition does not 
exist in the Questar case, and no amount of fancy footwork could leave a reason-
able mind convinced that the problem introduced by the minority nature of 
Questar can be reliably dealt with. 
Indeed, the very Commission that has endorsed the stock-and-debt method 
for Questar found that the same method was inappropriate for another interstate, 
FERC-regulated pipeline company that was a second-tier subsidiary of a parent. 
In Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Property Tax Division, Appeal Nos. 85-0074 and 
86-0255 (Utah Tax Comm'n, Dec. 21, 1987),24 the Commission concluded: 
[I]t is very difficult to determine what portion of the stock and debt of 
The Williams Company [parent] should be allocated to Petitioner 
[Northwest Pipeline Corporation]. Further, there is no specific 
information available concerning the market value of the non-public 
stock. Because of the difficulties associated with accurately allocat-
ing a portion of the equity value of the parent company's non-public-
ly traded stock to Petitioners, two tiers down, we find that the stock 
24The Northwest Pipeline case is included as Addendum C. 
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and debt indicator is the least reliable of the three traditional indica-
tors and will be given little, if any, weight. 
Northwest Pipeline, slip op. at 6 (emphasis added). The focus of this conclusion 
is well-reasoned—there are insurmountable difficulties in the allocation process. 
It is true that the parent of Northwest Pipeline Corporation was not publicly 
traded, which may have complicated the problem further. But the Commission's 
analysis centered first on the inability to allocate a portion of the parent com-
pany's value to a company two tiers down. This problem is no less present for 
Questar as a second-tier, minority subsidiary of Questar Corporation than it was 
for Northwest Pipeline. To treat two interstate pipelines that are in nearly con-
gruent situations does not comport with the arbitrary-and-capricious standards of 
UAPA § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
Division witness Eckhardt Prawitt recognized this relative problem when he 
testified that he would be inclined to weight the stock-and-debt indicator much 
higher if the subsidiary to be evaluated was as much as 90% of the size of the 
corporate parent. (R. 168.) The corollary to this concession is that the smaller 
the percentage, the more difficult it is to ascribe the characteristics of the parent to 
that of the subsidiary through a reasonable allocation (much less the characteristics 
of other diversified companies). 
Prof. Heaton incorporated this very high degree of variability in his analy-
sis, but he did not reject the method out of hand. He merely took account of the 
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low level of reliability that every witness who testified on this subject was forced 
to recognize. Even Prof. Hanke, who thought that the stock-and-debt indicator 
was the be-all for estimating FMV, admitted that there were subjective allocation 
problems in a case of this kind. (R. 143-45, 156.) 
Although the Commission purports to distinguish Questar from Northwest 
Pipeline in the application of the stock-and-debt method, there is no substantial 
distinction. The allocation problems identified in the Northwest discussion are 
equally applicable to Questar. That the Williams Company is not publicly traded 
simply provides an additional level of complication. 
IV. THE COMMISSION'S APPARENT RELIANCE ON 
THE INCOME METHOD DOES NOT COMPORT WITH 
THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT THE 
INCOME METHOD IN THIS CASE IS EQUIVALENT 
TO THE STOCK-AND-DEBT METHOD. 
Without specifying underlying reasons, the Commission has declared that 
the "income approach is the most reliable" of the methods. The December 3 
order does not explain why this is so, it specifically does not explain why this 
indicator measures what a willing buyer and willing seller would agree to as the 
value of Questar Pipeline Company. It also does not address the critical issue of 
the relationship between the income and stock-and-debt indicators, as used by the 
parties. In fact, the Commission's declaration does not indicate to what extent it 
considered—if at all—the demonstration of Prof. Heaton that the two methods are 
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functionally equivalent, with minor computational differences. 
In his attempt to analyze the reliability question carefully, Prof. Heaton 
undertook a careful, analytic approach to the problem of determining, as reliably 
as possible under the circumstances surrounding Questar, the most likely FMV of 
its property. Although the Commission order largely ignores the analysis because 
of its perception that property tax appraisals are a matter of judgment, it is evi-
dence that must be considered—especially when substantial portions of it are not 
disputed. 
The thrust of Prof. Heaton's development is that, as a statistical matter, the 
Tax Commission is looking for the most reliable, most likely estimator of the 
FMV. It must, therefore, give due consideration to the relative dependence or 
independence of the individual estimators and to their individual reliability and 
likely variation from the true values. Because there has been no recent pur-
chase/sale of Questar, it is recognized that any of these methods are inherently 
approximate, and a reasoned synthesis of the information must recognize the 
strengths and shortcomings of the methods. 
Prof. Heaton derived a statistical model (a model with which no one took 
any exception) that sought to minimize the statistical variance of the ultimate result 
as a function of the likely reliability and dependence of the three individual esti-
mators. (R. 253-64 [Ex. 5].) 
A key ingredient of Prof. Heaton's analysis was the demonstration that the 
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income method and the stock and -debt method utilized by the Property Tax, Divi 
sioi i were equivalent,, That, is, although there were minor differences it i 1:1 le 
It i i i i i i i i i o l o g ) iiiiiii Il II MI 1111 mi mi II ilii iiii iiriiiiill l l i M l i n i i li N I M I I S I M I I ill 111 (ill III) 11 il il III I;I IK 1 ill i," 
information used to generate the two results was exactly the same and that there 
was a mathematical equivalence of the two What, was identified, as an "income 
metn, * i 
IK l()| ) The significance of this is that the Proper ty Tax Division did not use two 
independent methods; there is real!)/ only one method designated by two different 
names. 
iportant fn" n f"1 1h;if no witness contested Prof, iicuiun * ->-7 aiui 
conclusion about the equivalence of the two methods. Yet, the Commission's 
oruei does v** ~ven address >
 r ..ui.i . . icance n 
Assume *i vrvndent 
methods and that the thict methods are equallv lik/lv to measua- ihc i ^ v )f the 
subject property —i.e., each, woi ild be assigned a wcighl ol S.\ 1/3%, If method A 
weighted value will be .333 x ($200 + $300 + $300) = $267. However, if it is 
shown,, that methods B and, C are not really different methods, but simply the same 
metn " i!> Mill ii'.s 
less likely to produce the right answer than the other, thui the proper calculations 
would be to assign, 50% * eight, to each, of methods A and, B (or Q , w itli a, sub 
stantially different result: .50 x ($200 + $300) = $250.25 
In the case before the Commission, method B was analogous to the "in-
come" method and method C, the stock-and-debt method.26 Prof. Heaton's 
analysis incorporated this equivalence, and his mathematical model took it into ac-
count. He did not ignore the other methods; he simply reflected their quality and 
close statistical correlation. No witness disputed his derivation nor his proof of 
the income/stock-and-debt equivalence. Prof. Heaton's approach provided a 
sound and analytic basis on which to evaluate the information that is available to 
the Commission to determine Questar's FMV, but the Commission ignored this 
evidence entirely—a result that is in conflict with § 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the UAPA. 
Having ignored it, the Commission then compounded the error by claiming that 
"the stock and debt approach tests the reliability of the other two approaches." 
(R. 9.) A method that is a clone of a method can hardly be used to test the 
reliability of that method. 
Prof. Heaton discusses this effect in somewhat more technical terms. 
(R. 72.) 
26There are minor differences between the two methods, but Prof. Heaton has 
shown that their fundamental underpinnings are exactly the same. Minor compu-
tational differences only serve to reduce slightly the level of statistical correlation 
from 1.0 to something lower. (R. 88.) Prof. Heaton at one point assigned a 
statistical correlation of .85 to the two methods to account for these minor differ-
ences. (R. 92.) 
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V A \N ARM OF THE TAX COMMISSION, THE 
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION, HAS BEEN ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS IN ITS EVALUATION OF 
QUESTAR'S FAIR MARKET VALUE; ANY COMMISSION 
RELIANCE ON THE DIVISION'S RECOMMENDATION 
IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND NOT 
^ / P O R T E D BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The gravamen of this argument is that the Property 1 ax Division, as an arm,.. 
assessed COPMWM/J 1 M , , has advanced inconsistent, ever-changing positions and 
•• A1 ! \ supports a, conclusion that $296 million is the proper mea-
sure 
Theru are two elements to the difficulties that Questar faced in this case: 
fill The Division's process for weighting the * ari~ • * vnl"cs of the three agreed-on 
methods wa.'i nev er articulai III: i z 1: i.e ai ii lgs 
(?.) Taking the matter to a second dimension, tin, Division sponsored three w it 
nesses who took, w idel)/ diverse views of the appropriate way in, which a final 
property tax assessment should IK; obtained lion11 (lit" values ,I Ii1 ^ " . v g ' \ e n 
it i letl lods ine "Tax Con imission to range at will across 
the various possible vombmasnins. select one that suited, its fanc\ :»•' * '. JY 
fact til: lat at least someone had advanced a thtui) lli.il supp 
Hirst' atliins do nol pmvidr Ilir la\payer wiili n pitiable treatment and fair deal-
Although the December 3 decision does not explicitly cite ai \y Division 
witness's testimony. 
S.\-
ing, and they are not consistent with the requirements of the UAPA. 
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the elusiveness of the Division's ap-
proach to tax assessment is to refer to Exhibit 1, which is a summary of the 
various values that were in consideration at different times during the life of this 
proceeding. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Preliminary Official Discovery Stipulated 
Assessment Assess't Response Values 
$219 $210 $220 $210 
300 303 310 303 
362 340 340 312 
$300 $300 $292 $300 
TABLE A28 
($ in millions) 
What Exhibit 1 shows is that the Property Tax Division has no coherent, 
consistent theory of assigning weights to the individual methods as applied to 
Questar. There seems to be little or no rational connection that links the three 
component methods to the final appraisal. 
As indicated in column (a) of Exhibit 1, at the beginning of the proceeding, 
the Property Tax Division reconciled the three values $219/300/362 to get $300 
28Partial replication of Exhibit 1 (R. 245). $300 million in column (d) is from 
Mr. Prawitt's testimony. (R. 172-73.) 
Cost Method 
Income Method 




million as a preliminary assessment. No indication of the relative weights of 
thrsc numbers was ever given to Questar. 
AppiuAinidi 
p e r s o n n e } ? t j i e Divis ion significant!)/ modified its calculat ions of the three main 
i i i ;:!'tl i; :: ds to obtain the $ 2 1 0 / 3 0 3 / 3 4 0 shown in co lumn (b) of Exhilnil I I "he 
relat ive 'wuri
 BLI 1 it I n^ i1 ol I In sr in n i: lbei s * .n nil « in Il list losni! In ( )n<\slai I " Jolv ' in II II m 
standing thai Iwo oi the evaluations were materially reduced and there was only a 
smal- «!Kn' :>~ »» incon ie method, tl ic Division steadfastly insisted that the 
oven .... company was s(111 $ \III) 1111II1111n. 
MS r.m c\plain this result: either he income method was 
being assiei- jd nearK 100% of the weight, oi (b) the relative weightings of the 
three methods was a "d> nan lie" '" str ucture that cl langed ii i an unspecified a.) to 
for a sjate taxing agency, and the first conclusion is not borne out by an> of the 
evidence \ t no time during the proceedings did ai i) K itness claii i i 1:1 lall: til ie in-
ative weiglitifig of the "official assessment" in noliiinii (b) seems to 1 lave been 
implicitly engineered to produce the overall $300 million that was contained in the 
This was submitted to Qucstai on April 7, 1988. 
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preliminary assessment.30 
More inconsistency arises when column (c) of Exhibit 1 is examined. This 
column shows the values calculated by the Property Tax Division at a later time. 
When the Division responded to Questar's interrogatories, it provided workpapers 
that indicated its calculation of the three methods to be $220/310/340 millions, 
with a weighted value of $292 million.31 At the hearing, Mr. Prawitt could not 
explain why these numbers were different from those calculated previously by the 
Division, except that he had taken "another closer look."32 (R. 172-73.) 
The next, and last, set of values that demonstrates the unreliability of the 
evidence presented by the Division is its treatment of the stipulated values of 
$210/303/312 millions. With these values, the Property Tax Division returned to 
its position that the proper estimate of the fair market value of Questar is $300 
30Commissioner Davis seemed to pick up on this notion at one point in the 
proceedings. (R. 185-88.) 
3interrogatory no. 1 was: 
Provide all workpapers and other documents used to appraise 
Questar Pipeline Company for 1988. (Copies of tables, charts and 
workpapers already supplied to Questar Pipeline need not be dupli-
cated.) Include a description of all assumptions for each of the three 
methods that were used to produce an appraised value. In particular, 
please provide all information necessary to replicate the results 
reached by the Property Tax Division (the Division) for the three 
methods that were used (cost, income and market). 
(R. 314-15 [Ex. 9].) 
32This closer look is dated May 11, 1989 (R. 318), yet it was not supplied to 
Questar until June 1990 in response to the discovery request. 
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million. (R. 1 72.) A casual glance at these results indicates a level of inconsis 
tency that simply cannot be reconciled. To focus on this lack of consistency, two 
specific comparisons arc pailn, ml.til", il'liislutne. 
parison °f columns (a) and (d) again shows the Commission's Prop 
erty Tax Division slavishly trying to justify $300 million a s the weighted value 
where two of the components ai e s ie ::! ( ii t:i i 
h:uv !:(j 
In onlcr to sec the inconsistent more dnw r \ , some elementary arithmetic 
"^  liclplul '' Assuming loi the sake argument . > 
been t'lven ''O'^ wnrhl 1^  "In11 Pi p. r ! < «IVIMUH m tuiumn .* ilk, vuai caul 
stock-and-dehl methods would, necessanh, ?»e *??.% and 28% -.C-. 1. "i 
ordc- +~ ": i i -1 assessmen. , , \ -
.. .. weightings should 
change —none >\^ .^liii^d .u dunnt' the h<*ar:n^  hi II.-I? vase, applvini: \h\- '-auk* 
.22/.50/.28 weightings to the stipulated values in column (ill yields %JW") mil-
lion. 
33We are reduced to these kinds of exercises because the Commission has, as 
discussed at length in Part I of this argument, provided no explicit explanation of 
how it treated all this evidence, what weights it assigned, or how P arrived at 
$296 million. 
34
.22 x 214 i 50 v 100 i ?S x 362 = 300, (A simple algebraic calcula-
tion provides this result.) 
35
.22 x 210 + .50 x 303 •+ .28 x 312 = 285. 
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would be bound to a lower value than $296 million.36 If not, it is a mystery 
what evidence the Commission relied on. 
Even more inexplicable is the comparison between columns (c) and (d). 
Column (c) shows the Division's composite result to be $292 million.37 In col-
umn (d), every one of the three stipulated component values is less that the Divi-
sion's previous valuations in column (c), yet the Division's recommendation, 
articulated by Mr. Prawitt, increased back to $300 million. Other than pure 
caprice, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion except that the Property Tax 
Division did not honor the factual stipulation entered into by the parties. The 
cross-examination of Mr. Prawitt suggests as much. (R. 176-78.) Indeed, noth-
ing in Mr. Prawitt's testimony indicates that there was any analysis by the Divi-
sion of the composite assessment in light of the stipulated values for the three 
methods. Such capricious behavior is not consonant with principles of equitable 
treatment of the taxpayer and the strictures of the UAPA. 
Mr. Prawitt's testimony concerning the weightings to be used is not credi-
ble evidence upon which an agency can reasonably rely, and the Commission's 
36Quite apart from the shortcomings discussed in Parts II, III and IV of this 
argument. 
37The Division's counsel's claim that the $292 million response to Questar 
Pipeline Interrogatory was in the nature of a "settlement" is simply incorrect. 
(R. 180-81.) The interrogatory and its response speak for themselves, and there 
isn't the slightest hint that these were settlement numbers. 
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apparent reliance, at least in part, on this evidence is error under any reasonable 
standard of agency review and, a fortiori, under the IJAPA. 
Typk.; . oi uk . _ 
{C-;U JUI t | i e SpeC if l c values for weight ing the componen t s . F o r example, 
ir -1 :jialogij* with counsel : • 
n
 Y ou indicated about 1 5 % to the cost me thod , about 30 to 
4 0 % to the stock and debt method , and the rest to the income. 
Is that correct? 
A ir\ \:« Prawitt) ~ sounds about right T may say some 
thing different no i - m , because 
( 
coherent approach to ihu inipoiiaiit taa*. wi weight ing the informat ion contained in 
the three e\ aluatiori niethods and could not offer any explanat ion for the apparent -
ly inconsi.Si. ;.; ... . . estimate I ' I 1 \ ! 1 5 1 "9 7 ) I ;" :)i: 
example uoss-examination, mi. x'lawitt later gave tentative assent to a 
different weighting—20/60/20%, oi le which is consistei it w ith the (rather wide) 
ranges given in the answer to interrogatory no. 
notwithstanding sin h assignments IIIIII the 15-20% range to the cost method, at 
another point in his testimony, he proclaimed he had m faith in (he cost indicator 
(although he gave no reason lor this disavowal I ml I'I" I 
At si II jiMi'thf i (mini In- testified ilmf iln1 iml\ in dicator he had any faith in 
was the stock-and-debt indicator. ""The stipulated values I -you know -the only 
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one I really have any faith in is the stock and debt indicator." (R. 188.) This, of 
course, is not consistent with the rest of his testimony. And later still, he opined 
that he had changed his mind during this case about the relative reliability of the 
cost method as a result of "the Northwest Pipeline decision38 a number of years 
ago." (R. 189.) But the Northwest decision had been decided and issued by the 
Commission in 1987—before this case began in early 1988. 
This illustrates the taxpayer's frustration in dealing with an arm of an 
agency that offers a moving target. The taxpayer has been unable to determine 
exactly what its property-tax responsibilities are and the basis on which its taxes 
are being determined. Such treatment does not pass muster under the UAPA, as it 
is arbitrary and capricious. A reasonable person would not expect to be subjected 
to a tax-determination process that presented such a moving target with no stan-
dards. This, indeed, is the "standardless exercise" that the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals discussed in remanding the recent Tennessee Gas case to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission.39 
In short, the evidence sponsored by the Division to support its $300 million 
assessment is fraught with inconsistencies and implausible assertions. Any reli-
ance on such evidence is not reasonable under the standards of the UAPA. 
38A reference to Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Property Tax Division, Nos. 
85-0074 and 86-0255 (Utah Tax Comm'n, Dec. 21, 1987). 
39See note 15, supra. 
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SUMMARY 
Because the Commission's assessment of Questar's 1988 property taxes is 
unlawful mil I I he standards J lL I "AIM IL si ilium ] li'luiili-" i I* I IV!1 '" I 
pi II »i I ""in i in 11 II mi, "„s, ion polity, II II I i is i Iv reversed and remanded to ui^ commission ^ 
e valuate the FMV m a manner that properly comports with the lau Questar 
seeks instructions or guidelines froi n tl it11 Court requin .... . ,.< 
11 c WT I it i m i 1 III I i " 111111 M 11 v " i I ' h I i t l ii dlii in" i ii mi i s i t l e r a t i o n limitations 
placed oi i the returns to Questar's owners by FERC rate regulation, based on ihe 
1
 *eciated riginal cost rate base. (2) the broad variability and consequen* 
abiln : I 
non-publicly-traded minority portion of its corporate parent, and (3) the unrelated 
demonstration that, with minor variation, the "income method" i ised in i this case is 
equivalent I llu «,lon I mil iLhl inrlhml i,1, in (II i III Ilu I I I  I  11 il iiiiiii III ill In iiiiiiiu1 
"ruinuntied t w i n ? " 
Hit: p r o v i s i o n s of (fie U t a h A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e s A c e r e q u i r e s u c h 
considerations, 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Its attorney 
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rate making and other regulatory functions of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). At the time of 
assessment, Petitioner was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Entrada 
Industries, which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Questar 
Corporation. This made the Petitioner a second level 
subsidiary to Questar Corporation. Petitioner has no publicly 
held securities, whereas Questar Corporation is publicly held. 
During the period in question, Petitioner constituted 
approximately 29% of the total plant property and equipment of 
Questar Corporation. Petitioner's revenues were approximately 
33% of the total gross revenues of Questar Corporation and 
Petitioner's payroll was approximately 20% of Questar 
Corporation's total payroll. 
4. In a stipulation entered into between the 
parties, dated September 29, 1989, the parties agreed that the 
three approaches to value for the Petitioner's property are 
those known as the "cost method," the "income approach," and 
the "market (or stock-and-debt) method." The parties agreed 
further that the values per each of these methods for the year 
in question are as follows: 
a. Cost approach: $210,492r693. 
b. Income method: $303/000,000. 
c. Market (or 
stock-and-debt) 
method: $312,321,375. 
5. The single remaining issue, which is the subject 
of this case, is the correlation or reconciliation of the three 
values as determined in the different approaches, as just 
-2-
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outlined, from which a single assessed valuation is to be 
determined for the entire company. 
6. It is the Petitioner's position that a 78.8% 
weight should be placed upon a cost method of valuation with 
10.6% being placed upon each of the other two approaches. When 
these weights are applied to the stipulated values, then the 
correlation renders a result of $231,000,000 as Petitioner's 
value for its property. Petitioner asserts that the cost 
approach is the most applicable to Petitioner's situation 
because FERC regulations set the rate base on the depreciated 
cost of Petitioner's facilities. Petitioner's expert witness, 
Dr. Hal B. Heaton, presented a technically oriented, 
statistical analysis in support of Petitioner's position and in 
an effort to attack Respondent's analysis. Petitioner feels 
that the cost approach is more objective and analytical than 
the income or market sales approaches and is therefore a more 
reliable indicator of market value. 
7. It is Respondent's position that Dr. Heaton's 
methods are not in accord with the established and accepted 
principles and practices of the appraisal profession and that 
his estimates are based upon his own judgments, which are 
subjective and are not as objective as Dr. Heaton asserts. 
Respondent states that the quality of the data available, as 
well as the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, are what 
should determine the weighting to be given to each approach in 
the final correlation of value. Respondent feels that in this 
case, the market and income approaches more accurately reflect 
the conditions of the market than does Petitioner's approach, 
-3- 00000008 
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which depends on a mechanical, mathematical weighting that does 
not reflect the fluctuations and conditions of the actual 
market. Based upon these facts, Respondent, in placing more 
weight on the market and income approaches to value than the 
cost approach, renders a correlated value for the subject 
properties of approximately $300,000,000. 
8. The Tax Commission finds that in a case such as 
this, the market and income approaches to value are more 
reflective of actual market conditions than is the cost 
approach to value. This is because the cost approach is 
generally considered in the appraisal profession as a reliable 
indicator of value only when sufficient data and conditions are 
not present for the other two approaches. In this case, there 
is a more than sufficient amount of data to support a valuation 
based upon the market and income approaches. While the cost 
approach may appear to some, in a strict mathematical sense, to 
be more technically correct, it does not necessarily follow 
that that approach is also the most reflective of actual market 
conditions. Market values do not always conform to precise 
mathematical formulations. 
9. The Tax Commission finds, therefore, based upon 
the evidence before it, that the cost approach is the least 
reliable and the income approach is the most reliable. The 
stock and debt approach tests the reliability of the other two 
approaches. In applying these principles to the facts of this 
case, it is the opinion of the Commission that the correlated 
value is $296,000,000. 
-4-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Tax Commission is required to oversee the 
just administration of property taxes to ensure that property 
is valued for tax purposes according to fair market value. 
(Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210(7).) 
2. Petitioner takes the position that the market (or 
stock-and-debt) method should not be used in this case where 
Petitioner is a second tier subsidiary of Questar Corporation. 
Petitioner cites Northwest Pipeline Corporation vs. Property 
Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal Numbers 
85-0074 and 86-0255 (Utah Tax Commission 1987) in support of 
this position. Page six of that decision states as follows: 
The stock and debt indicator of value is 
difficult to apply to the Petitioner. 
Petitioner is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the Williams Company, a privately owned, 
non-public corporation. The parent 
corporation raises capital by the issuance 
of its own debt and that capital is then 
utilized in the business operations of the 
Williams Company and its several 
subsidiaries, including Petitioner. 
Therefore, it is very difficult to determine 
what portion of the stock and debt of the 
Williams Company should be allocated to 
Petitioner. Further, there is no specific 
information available concerning the market 
value of the non-public stock. Because of 
the difficulties associated with accurately 
allocating a portion of the equity value of 
the parent company's non-publicly traded 
stock to Petitioner, two tiers down, we find 
that the stock and debt indicator is the 
least reliable of the three traditional 
indicators and will be given little, if any, 
weight. 
That case does not change the result here. The parent company 
in Northwest Pipeline was a non-public corporation, whereas 
here, Questar Corporation is publicly traded. There is also 
00009010 
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some indication that Petitioner's portion of the total business 
of its parent corporation is a larger portion than that which 
was present in Northwest Pipeline. The difficulties present in 
that case, which rendered the stock-and-debt approach 
inappropriate, are not present here. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order 
of the Utah State Tax Commission that the value o£ the subject 
property for the tax year 1988 is $296,000,000. The Property 
Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission is hereby ordered 
to adjust its records in accordance with this decision. 
DATED this ^3 day of ^jfcQ.^ 1990. 





G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have ten (10) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF 
CALIFORNIA, AND AMERICAN 










STATEMENT OF DECISION 
This is an action for refund of property taxes paid by 
plaintiffs AT&T Communications of California, Inc. ("AT&T 
California") and American Telephone and Telegraph Company -
Interstate Division ("AT&T Interstate") for the year 1986. 
Plaintiffs are both units of AT&T Communications. AT&T 
Communications, in turn, is a division (although not a legal 
entity) of American Telephone & Telegraph Company, comprising 
the regulated long distance telecommunications service 
operation of AT&T. The value of plaintiffs1 property in 
California for tax purposes was centrally assessed by defendant 
1 State Board of Equalization ("the Board"), pursuant to Revenue 
2 & Taxation Code sections 721-833. AT&T California was assessed 
3 at $1,150,000,000. AT&T Interstate was assessed at 
J $600,000,000. Plaintiffs contend that the Board overassessed 
g their property at a value in excess of the fair market value 
g and that the taxes assessed by the Board and paid by plaintiffs 
n to the defendant counties were illegally and erroneously 
gll assessed and collected, 
g Revenue & Taxation Code section 5170 governs this action. 
IQ It provides: 
11 "In suits for the refund of state-assessed property taxes, the trial court shall not 
I2|| be restricted to the administrative record, 
but shall consider all evidence relating to 
joll the valuation of the property admissible 
under the rules of evidence. The court 
|i shall base its decision upon the preponder-















The Board moved for summary judgment, declaring the 
statute unconstitutional. The motion was denied by the 
Sacramento County Superior Court, Judge Anthony 
DeCristoforo, Jr., on August 25, 1989. The Board's petition 
for a writ of mandate seeking review of this decision was 
denied by the Court of Appeal for the Third District on 
September 27, 1989. The issue is therefore determined for 
purposes of this trial. See Code of Civil Procedure 
section 437(f); Conway v. Bughouse, Inc. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 
202-203. The Court has proceeded in accordance with Revenue & 
Taxation Code section 5170. The Court has considered not only 
all relevant evidence from the administrative record offered by 
the parties, but also the additional "evidence relating to 
2 valuation of the property "admissible under the rules of 
211 evidence" offered by the parties. 
o The Court finds that plaintiffs adequately exhausted 
J their administrative remedies before the Board and adequately 
g stated their grounds for refund in the claims for refund filed 
gji with the defendant counties. The claims for refund asserted 
Jl that the tax has been "erroneously or illegally collected" and 
g "illegally assessed or levied" (PI. Ex. 132-133), the statutory 
grounds for refund under Revenue & Taxation Code section 5096. 
This appears to be a sufficient statement. Bret Harte Inn, 
Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1976) 16 Cal.3d 14, 
28. If more is needed, the Court finds that plaintiffs' 
petitions for reassessment and claims for refund were adequate 
notice to the Board and the defendant counties that plaintiffs 
asserted that their property was overvalued because of factual 
and legal errors in the income and cost approach methodology 
employed by the Board. Plaintiffs were not required to specify 
every detail of what later became a six-week inquiry into 
valuation theory. For this trial de novo, the basic issue was 





















In view of the complex nature of this action, the Court 
deems it appropriate to make some preliminary comments and 
findings before proceeding to discuss in detail the factual and 
legal basis for its decision. 
By enacting Revenue & Taxation Code section 5170, 
effective January 1, 1989, the Legislature imposed on already 
c^f rburdened trip.] cmrtr the ccir-plox subject of valuation of 
public utilities. Before the enactment of Section 5170, the 
function of the Court was to review the administrative record 
to determine whether or not the market value of property, as 
determined by the Board of Equalization, was supported by 
substantial evidence. After the enactment of Section 5170, the 
function of the Court is to make an independent determination 
of market value based on a preponderance of the evidence. The 
Court, by the terms of Section 5170, is not restricted by the 
administrative record, but is to consider all evidence relating 
to valuation which is admissible under the Rules of Evidence. 
The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff property owner. As 
is to be expected, the trial of such actions takes 
substantially longer than the administrative hearing, as each 
side not only presents those portions of the administrative 
record which are favorable to its position but presents 
testimony from experts and others to fortify its position. 
The inevitable result of a trial of such actions is that 
the Court, by its decision, imposes on the Board the judgment 
of the trial judge as to how market value is to be determined. 
If the trial judge determines that the State Board of 
Equalization's methods of valuation are incorrect, then it 
sends a message to the Board to change those methods of 
valuation to those the judge believes to be appropriate, 
regardless of how difficult, time-consuming, or expensive it 
may be to implement those methods. In the usual situation, the 
Court must choose which method of valuation is the one most 
likely to lead to the correct value, unless it elects to pick 
and cheer.c from the export testimony to arrive at a market 
~^4-
j value which the Court determines is fair and reasonable under 
91| the evidence in the case. 
3j[ If the Court elects to accept the method or methods of 
A \ \ the plaintiff's experts over the defendant's experts, or vice 
g versa, what results, as the Court has seen a number of times in 
g this case, is that the plaintiff or the defendant will later 
^ point to a holding of a trial court, either in this state or 
g another state, to persuade the Court that the experts 
g testifying before the Court, particularly where they are the 
JQ same experts who testified in the previous cases, which is the 
2* usual situation, are either brilliant or incompetent, or both, 
12 depending upon the holdings of the trial courts in those 
23 previous cases. By virtue of hearing a case on valuation, a 
-• j trial judge ostensibly becomes an expert on valuation, whose 
25 opinion is to be accepted over experts who have devoted their 
2g lives to the subject. 
2«7 If this Court has learned anything in this trial, it is 
2g that determining the fair market value of a public utility is a 
2Q most difficult task. It is an issue over which reasonable 
90 minds - both judges and experts on valuation - may differ 
91 markedly. As the evidence in this case disclosed, there are at 
92 least five different methods of valuing a public utility, each 
23 of which - or none of which - may be applicable in a particular 
24 case. Furthermore, one method of valuation may result in a 
25 value vastly different than another method of valuation. 
2(j Valuation cannot be done with mathematical certainty; it is an 
27 art, not a science. It boils down to an intelligent exercise 
28 °* judgrr-crt. It 5 ^  £]w?yr an estirate built on a foundation of 
~£ _. 
assumption. It is an attempt to ascertain what a public 
utility would sell for if it were for sale under ideal 
conditions, between a willing and knowledgeable buyer and a 
willing and knowledgeable seller. Since there are relatively 
few sales of public utilities, and those few that are made are 
not typical, there are no comparable sales upon which to base 
value. Instead, conclusions as to market value are based on 
each appraiser's best judgment, and each appraiser approaches 
the task of valuation with his own assumptions and theories as 
to what potential buyers and sellers would or should consider 
in arriving at a price. 
Experts, even those on the same side, seldom agree with 
the methods of other experts. The most graphic example of that 
in this case is that the outside experts retained by the Board 
of Equalization to make an independent valuation of the 
plaintiff's property, used methods other than those used by the 
Board's in-house appraisers and were of the opinion that the 
composite limited-life method of appraisal used by the in-house 
appraisers was not a good method of valuation for plaintiff 
public utilities, which did not have a limited life. The 
in-house appraisers for the state, as well as the manuals used 
by the state for valuation, were of the view that the 
stock-and-debt method of valuation, which was the basic method 
used by the state's outside appraisers, was not a good method 
of valuing a public utility whose stock was not traded in the 
open market. Plaintiffs are subsidiaries of AT&T and do not 
have publicly traded securities. The Board's outside 
acpraifrcrs purported to use ar: ir-come approach in addition to a 
-c-
j II stock and debt approach. The Court finds, howeverf that the 
2 so-called direct-capitalization-income approach used by them is 
g not a true income approach but is in reality a stock-and-debt 
^ approach in the guise of an income approach. 
5 Ironically, both the Board's in-house appraisers and its 
g outside appraisers ended up with approximately the same result, 
^ a valuation, which in the view of the Court, was grossly 
g excessive. The conclusion is inescapable that the methods 
n employed by both the Board's in-house and outside appraisers 
IQ were not methods likely to result in the correct market value 
11 °f public utilities such as those involved in this case. 
j9 The fact that the value set by the Board and its experts 
jo was grossly excessive was convincingly established by the 
|4 testimony of Dr. Hal B. Heaton, an associate professor of 
jc finance at Brigham Young University, who for the past two years 
|g has been teaching at Harvard Business School. The basic 
17 premise of Dr. Heaton's testimony was that in order to pay 
ig $16,000,000,000 for the system property of AT&T, the value set 
19 ky the Board, one would have to finance the purchase price and, 
on in order to do so, one would have to convince investors that 
91 there would be sufficient cash flows to pay them a fair rate of 
22 return, given the risk of the investment, plus a return of 
23 principal. He demonstrated that, realistically, this could not 
24 be done. He used four different scenarios: a zero growth; a 
25 negative growth; a 60 percent pay-out; and a 30 percent 
26 pay-out. In each of these scenarios, he made unrealistically 
27 optimistic assumptions about future cash flows. He 
2S dencr.str?t-c(? crnv: rr: ngly that ever with such unrealistically 
-7-
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-til optimistic assumptions, the numbers just did not work. In 
2 other words, one could not justify a value of the system 
g property of AT&T of $16,000,000,000 or even close to it. The 
M\\ testimony of Dr. Heaton made good sense and was consistent with 
g the fact that AT&T is a regulated utility which cannot earn 
more than a fixed percentage of its rate base, except in rare 
~\\ situations which were not present in this case. The only 
jj conceivable way that it could be valued substantially in excess 
of its rate base would be to assume that it would be 
deregulated in the foreseeable future. Such an assumption is 
unsupportable under the evidence in this case. In fact, the 
evidence supports a contrary finding. 
Having made the aforesaid preliminary comments and 
findings, I shall now set forth more specifically the factual 
and legal basis for my decision in this case. In doing so, I 
have considered the proposed statement of decision submitted by 
plaintiffs and the objections thereto submitted by the 
defendants. Where there was a conflict in the evidence, my 
recitation of the facts reflects how I resolved that conflict. 
After consideration of the evidence presented, I find 
upon a preponderance of the evidence that the fair market 





















March 1, 19 86, are: 
For AT&T California - $748,959,533 
For AT&T Interstate - $364,880,423. 
As of the lien date, AT&T Interstate was regulated by the 
Fedrrcl Ccmiruni rnticns CommiFsion ("FCC"); AT&T California war, 
-8-
j regulated both by the FCC and by the California Public 
2 Utilities Commission ("CPUC"). AT&T Communications was 
g required to provide adequate and proper communications services 
^ at regulated rates to those who request service. The rates 
g plaintiffs may charge were regulated by the rate base/rate of 
g return method. Under that method, plaintiffs were allowed to 
j \ \ charge rates that may generate revenues sufficient to cover 
« costs of service — the total of operating expenses, 
q depreciation, taxes, and a reasonable rate of return on rate 
JA base. Plaintiffs were only allowed the opportunity to earn, 
U not guaranteed, a reasonable return on rate base. Rate base, 
j9 under regulation, is basically original cost of plant in 
jo service, plus materials and supplies, plus working capital, 
«4 less accumulated depreciation and less accumulated deferred 
income taxes. 
The FCC and CPUC determine the rate of return using the 
j7J| same general principles. Each component of the capital 
•to structure — debt, preferred stock, and common stock — is 
jo evaluated. The rate of return on (or cost of) debt and 
on preferred stock is fixed at the "embedded" or actual cost. The 
91 rate of return on (or market cost of) equity is estimated by 
90 the regulators. The rate of return on equity is designed to 
23 estimate that rate of return currently currently required to 
24 attract equity capital to the utility, given its particular 
25 risk characteristics. The final rate of return is determined 
2Q to be a weighted average of the rate of return allowed on each 





« Rate base is significant as a value indicator for a 
2 regulated public utility, such as plaintiffs. Rate base is 
o relevant in estimating the fair market value of the property 
J because the fair market value should reflect the earning 
g capability of the property. The regulatory process makes rate 
/J base the maximum amount upon which the regulated company, or a 
purchaser, will be permitted to earn a fair rate of return. 
Fair market value may be higher or lower than rate base for a 
given company at a given point in time; the Court does not mean 
to imply that rate base is ceiling on value. The Court finds, 
however, that rate base is the focal point of value and the 
value of a public utility that is totally regulated, as 
plaintiffs are, will not exceed rate base in the absence of 
unusual circumstances, which do not exist in this case. 
Rate base is a measure of what the regulators deem to be 
the capital at work. The regulators set cost of equity capital 
at the current return available in the market place; regulatory 
estimates are reasonable. The goal of regulation is to allow 
the utility to earn a reasonable return on capital and to 
attract new capital at a fair price. The purchaser of 
regulated utility property must live in the same regulatory 
environment and would expect to earn only the same return on 
rate base. Since the purchaser of utility property must be 
presumed to have other investment opportunities available to 
him, it would not be logical to assume that a purchaser would 
accept a lower return by buying utility property at a price 

























1 The Board's appraisal expert witnesses justified values 
2 in excess of rate base upon the speculation that AT&T 
g Communications would be deregulated or its rates would be 
4 increased. The Court finds that the assumptions were in error 
g and not supported by the evidence, AT&T was a rate base 
g regulated utility as of the lien date and there was no 
^ reasonable expectation that this situation would change in the 
g foreseeable future. The Court finds that in 1986, a reasonable 
g willing buyer and a reasonable willing seller would not 
IQ consider deregulation in their assessment of value. 
jj Moreover, regulation is a substitute for competition, 
j2 There would have to be true competition for deregulation of. 
jo AT&T Communications ever to occur and excess profits would be 
14 unobtainable in a true competitive environment. The Court 
jc finds on the evidence in this case that deregulation in any 
|g environment it would be likely to occur would not increase 
jnii value. 
jo Determination of Value. The Court finds the system value 
jq of the taxable property of AT&T Communications to be rate 
20J1 b a s e* Rate base of the taxable property of the AT&T 
2j Communications system is $10,137f112,000. This figure excludes 
22 nontaxable working capital and construction work in process 
23 ("CWIP"). In order to produce a California value for each 
24 
28 
25JI — Substantial authority from out-of-state supports valuing 
regulated utility property at rate base for property tax 
2(j|| purposes, absent some persuasive evidence that establishes a 
different value. See Montaup Electric v. Board of Assessors, 
27jI 390 Mass. 847, 460 N.E.2d 583 (1984); Boston Edison Co. v. 
Assessors of Watertown, 387 Mass. 298, 439 N.E.2d 763 (1983); 
State* ex rel . Wisconsin River Power Co. v. Board of Review, 125 




























individual taxpayer from the system valuation at rate base of 
AT&T Communications, it is necessary to allocate the system 
value to the value of the property of the two taxpayers in 
California, apply a taxable percentage, and add growth 
2/ telephone plant under construction in California,— and the 
investment of participating carriers. The Court finds the 
percentage allocations and additives set forth in PI. Ex. 60 to 
be true and correct. The California values the Court finds are 
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— The Court accepts the allocation percentages testified to 
ir detail by Wayne Henderson between growth and replacement 
CWIP. (TR. 445-465; PI.Ex.46-51). These percentages are 
carried forward into the Schoenwald appraisal. (TR. 980-81; 
PI. Ex. 60). To the extent that there is a conflict in the 
evidence on the correct allocation percentages, the Court 
rrfolvcs th^ conflict ir, fpvor of plaintiffs. Growth CWIP is 
the correct addition to the system value to reach fair market 
value. 
1 These values are next allocated among the defendant 
2 counties according to the method of computation set forth in 
3 PI•Ex. 132-34. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to judgments 
4 for tax refunds against the respective defendant counties in 
5 the amounts set forth in the allocation tabulations attached 
g hereto as Exhibits A and B. Plaintiffs are further entitled to 
7 interest at 9 percent per annum from the date of filing the 
g claims for refund to the date of judgment, to be included in 
g the judgment. See Revenue & Taxation Code section 5150. The 
20 Court finds prejudgment interest to run from October 5, 1987. 
j] In reaching these values, the Court has employed the 
22 income approach to value as the fundamental approach to be 
23 followed. The Court considers this to be the most realistic 
24 and reasonable value approach, on the evidence in this case. A 
25 purchaser of regulated utility property must be assumed to act 
26 rationally. The purchaser would not invest its money in 
27 property on which it could only earn less than a market rate of 
28 return when other investment opportunities are available to the 
29 investor in the investment marketplace. A prospective 
20 purchaser would expect to realize the income that the seller 
21 could potentially realize on the regulated property. 
22 The rate of return permitted under regulation is the 
23 regulatory determination of a fair market rate of return on 
24 equity, although only the embedded or historic return on debt 
25 is permitted. Since, at the lien date, the market rate of 
26 return on debt was higher than the historic rate of return on 
27 AT&T's actual debt, a hypothetical purchaser of the regulated 
2S property vrculc either have to absorb the difference cr seek a 
j rate increase which the Court, as noted, finds a purchaser 
2 would not be entitled to assume. Moreover, AT&T Communications 
3 had not historically been able to earn its allowed rate of 
4 return. The Company was also subject in 1986 to regulation 
5 that required automatic refunds of earnings above the allowed 
g rate of return in individual service categories without any 
7 recovery of deficiencies. The regulatory treatment was likely 
g to cause a lowered long-term realizable rate of return below 
g the allowed rate. In setting value at rate base, therefore, 
20 the Court rejects plaintiffs1 position that value should be 
22 less than rate base by reason of the likely inability to 
22 achieve the allowed rate or return and the obsolescence imposed 
23 ky regulation through the allowance of only the embedded or 
24 historic cost of debt. Offsetting these factors, is 
25 plaintiffs' potential for earning above the allowed rate of 
2g return by the margin permitted under regulation. The Court 
27 finds that a willing buyer and willing seller would most 
23 probably project the future rate of return at the allowed rate 
2g of return under regulation. 
20 Finally, in determining value at rate base, the Court has 
21 made the same addition to net utility operating income and 
22 deduction from it that Dr. Schoenwald made in his appraisal. 
23 In order to derive the net cash flow that the purchaser could 
24 b e e x P e c t e d t o realize from the regulated property, the Court 
25 adds back to net income the amount of AT&T Communications1 book 
26 depreciation to reach gross cash flow; from this is deducted an 
27 amount for capital expenditures equal to depreciation, 
OQ returning to a figure- for ret msh flow that in the same as the 
-14-
I original net utility operating income. This computation makes 
9 the addition of depreciation required by Rule 8(c) and DeLuz 
3 Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1955) 45 Cal.3d 546, and 
4 makes the deduction of capital expenditures required by the 
g definition of gross outgo in Rule 8(c). The Rule requires the 
g deduction of "capital expenditures (or annual allowances 
^ therefore) required to develop and maintain the estimated 
g income." For a rate base regulated utility, if necessary 
g capital outlays are deducted from cash flow equal to 
in depreciation, they restore rate base. Consequently, AT&T 
Communications1 rate base will be maintained, the related 
earning power will be maintained and the telecommunications 
11 
12 
13 operating system will be maintained. Unless rate base is 
maintained by investments equal to the annual decline in rate 
jr|| base resulting from depreciation of assets, rate base will 
-tgii decline. Income will therefore also decline as the rate or 
Yj I return is applied to a smaller rate base. 
jo The Court has thereby determined value based upon an 
income approach, capitalizing the net cash flow that could be 
realized on rate base at the allowed regulatory rate of return, 
which the Court determines to be a reasonable estimate of the 
2o|| market cost of capital, to reach a value at rate base. 
90 The Court deems it significant that the 1986 values from 
21 states assessing AT&T Communications on a unit basis ranged 






2(j a median of $10,670,000,000. Virtually all these values 
27 
28 
include working capital (it is an exempt intangible in 
California). The Board's valup converted to a system va3ue was 
- 1 r-
1 $17,500,000,000. The California imputed system value is thus 
2 some $4,500,000,000 higher than the next highest state, and 
3 $7,000,000,000 higher than the median of the other states doing 
^ unit appraisals. The Court's system value determination (if 
g system working capital is added as computed by the Board) is 
g above the median value determination of other state taxing 
^ authorities. 
g The Board's Appraisal. The Court would ordinarily find 
o no necessity to analyze the methodology underlying the Board's 
in appraisal as the Court has made a factual determination 
U rejecting the Board's value results on the grounds already 
12 stated. The Request for Statement of Decision filed by the 
jo Board and the City and County of San Francisco requests that 
IJ analysis, however. That analysis will demonstrate that the 
jc Board's results are wrong. 
|g The Board's value findings were not supported by the 
*7 evidence. The Board occupied much trial time stating the 
lg assumptions of its appraisal but offered no factual evidence to 
19 support the assumptions. Plaintiffs proved critical factual 
9Q assumptions of the Board's income and cost approaches to be 
91 wrong. "An expert must base his opinion either on facts 
22 personally observed or on hypotheses that find support in the 
93 evidence. [Citations omitted.]11 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
24 G.W. Thomas Drayage Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 44. If the 
95 expert's opinion is based on factual assumptions that are not 




II 3 / 
j admitted, is not substantial evidence to support a judgment.— 
2 The 1986 Board appraisal, as an opinion of value, is not 
g substantial evidence to support a judgment. 
4 The Board presented no fact witness to support its 
g assumptions and no expert witness to verify the conclusions of 
J its 1986 appraisal. The Board's only staff expert witness, 
~ Mr. Hendrick, had not formed any opinion of market value. He 
g could have prepared a new appraisal but did not do so and was 
g not asked to do so. The Court rejects as lacking basis in 
-Q substantial evidence his opinion that the 1986 appraisal was 
jj "consistent with market value." Mr. Hendrick could not verify: 
29 (1) the 14-year life estimate upon which the composite life was 
2o based; (2) the capitalization rate study that produced the 
24 11.25 percent basic capitalization rate; or (3) any of the 
factual information in the appraisal. In addition, he had not 
2gj| formed an opinion of value with which to compare the 1986 
27 results and could not tell how the 1986 appraiser had reached 
her conclusions. 
2g|| The Board's appraisal was based upon an historical cost 
on approach and its composite limited-life-income approach. There 
91 was no stock and debt indicator computed. 
22 
23 3 / 
— Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Zuckerman (1987) 189 
24 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1134-1136 (expert's opinion of property value 
in eminent domain case had nc evidentiary value and was not 
25 substantial evidence to support judgment where based on 
speculation and "assumptions which are not supported by the 
9P record"); Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 325 
11




j The Board's Composite Limited Life Model. The Board's 
2 composite limited-life model begins with net operating income, 
g and then adds back taxes and depreciation. The gross cash flow 
^ thereby derived is capitalized by dividing it by a 
g capitalization rate that includes a so-called basic rate for 
g return on investment plus a component for tcixes and a sinking 
^ fund factor for capital recovery (derived by reference to the 
g basic rate and the assumed composite estimated remaining life 
g average of the diverse assets of the taxpayer). A land 
10 aversion is added to the result. The capital recovery factor 
22 is not a substitute for capital replacements. The model makes 
|9 no provision for necessary capital replacements. "Capital 
13 expenditures are outside the model." (TR. 598.) The assumed 
14 capital recovery is far less than the replacement expense 
15 necessary for telecommunications operations to continue. 
jg The central factual determination that must be made in 
17 the limited-life model is the estimate of the composite 
jo remaining life of the assets. The longer the life, the smaller 
jo the capital recovery factor in the capitalization rate, and the 
90 higher the value. Mr. Hendrick admitted that an error in the 
2j composite life estimate would produce an error in the 
22 appraisal. William Jackson, the manager of the Unit Valuation 
23 Section, conceded there would be a "big problem" if the life 
estimate is wrong — "the bigger the error in your life 
estimate, the bigger the problem." (TR. 1860). Mr. Jackson 
24 
25 
9P agreed in response to the Court's questions that "the critical 
27 
28 
factor is the estimate of the life" (TR. 1504); and that there 
would be ar; incorrect assessment of value if the life is wrong., 















1 (TR. 1536). On direct examination, he volunteered: "If we get 
2 the wrong life . . .we get a problem" (TR. 1513) . "We do 
o recognize that the income approach is very much subject to 
J error unlike the cost approach. . . . If you make an error in 
g your life estimate . . . the error compounds. Because the 
g present wording tends to compound errors. . . ." (TR. 1529-30). 
^ There was no evidence to support the 14-year composite 
jj estimated remaining life that the Board used in 1986. The life 
q computation was carried forward from a 1980 study, based upon 
the 1979 assets of the AT&T Long Lines division, a different 
taxpayer. There was no study done and no estimate of the 
composite remaining life of the 1986 assets that were the 
subject of the appraisal. There had been sweeping 
technological change between 1979 and the lien date in 1986. 
The introduction of digital switching systems and fiber optics 
transformed telecommunications technology in that period. 
Competition in long distance service increased. The new 
technology and increased competition shortened lives of plant. 
AT&T Communications was required to implement the new 
technology to meet competition or else lose additional market 
share. Its 1986 telecommunications plant was in substantial 
part obsolete. AT&T Communications in 1986 was engaged in a 
major capital asset replacement program to meet competition and 





The Eoard took no account of these undisputed facts in 
1986, although it did to some extent in the next few years. 
The composite life estimate the Board used for plaintiffs in 
1987 was eight years, decreasing tc si:: years in 1989, and five 
-19-
j years in 1990. Mr. Hendrick admitted that plaintiffs' position 
2 to the Board in 1986 requesting a seven year life was 
3 "reasonable" (TR. 1445-46) . Plaintiffs offered calculations of 
4 composite remaining life that were (after rounding down one 
5 year and rounding fractions per Board practice) eight years for 
g each plaintiff based on lives determined by the FCC and seven 
7 years for AT&T Interstate and six years for AT&T California 
g based on company engineering and marketing studies. The Court 
g finds that the Board's 1986 14-year composite life estimate is 
jA wrong. 
Ij The limited-life model is based on four factual 
jo assumptions that find no support in the evidence. Each of the 
jo first three assumptions is necessary to the validity of the 
24 model; the fourth is necessary to the validity of the Board's 
25 modified capitalized income approach calculation. 
2g First, the limited-life model assumes that it 
2«7 capitalizes for a limited period of time a hypothetical "level 
2g annuity equivalent" of an undefined actual declining income 
2g stream. The Board has never determined if this assumption is 
on true. The Board has never defined the declining income stream, 
21 either on a theoretical basis or for any taxpayer. 
22 Mr- Hendrick could not define the line of declining income 
23 stream. 
24 Second, the liiiited-lif ^  no<;o.: ^r,f:un-e c that the 
25 declining income stream from the lien date assets can be 
26 maintained without capital replacements for the composite 
27 limited life (at least). The Board has never determined if 
2S this ascumptiur: is true. Mr. Hendrick admitted that if capital 
j II replacements do have to be made to maintain the assumed 
2 declining income stream, then the Board would have to use a 
on different model. 
j I The Board's composite life model will always inflate 
g value, even given its assumption that replacements can be 
g ignored. The level annuity income stream that the model 
~ assumes forces more income into the early years of the 
jj composite life, thereby erroneously increasing present value 
q above the present value of the actual declining income stream 
from the rate base regulated assets, scheduled out year by year 
and discounted. The Court finds the Board's assumption that 
its hypothetical level annuity income stream is equal to the 
proper actual declining income stream for plaintiffs is wrong. 
Wayne Henderson, AT&T's witness directly involved in 
capital budgeting, outlined the capital expenditures that AT&T 
was required to make in 1985 to remain in business. He 
testified that AT&T could not continue without capital 
replacements for even two years and that a "death spiral" would 
soon result unless continuous replacements were made. 
Mr. O'Rourke testified that computations projecting 
depreciation from assets in place without replacements don't 
"have anything to do with reality." Plant is continually being 
replaced for a utility. (TR. 1653-54.) The Board's assumption 
that the assumed declining income stream for plaintiffs can be 
maintained without replacements is wrong. 
By this assumption, the Board assumes away Rule 8(c). 
If, as is the fact here, replacement expenditures are 




















1 stream, then, under Rule 8(c), those expenditures must be 
2 deducted to reach the net cash flow that is properly to be 
o capitalized. 
4 The amount of income to be capitalized must be 
g discretionary income available to the utility owner. No true 
g value can be derived by capitalizing supposed "cash flow" that 
7 is required to operate the utility. The Board could not 
o properly capitalize as income supposed "cash flow" that the 
g utility must devote to maintenance of plant, or to salaries of 
IQ employees, or to any other necessary expense of operation. The 
JJ same is true of supposed "cash flow" that must be devoted to 
j9 replacements necessary to maintain operations, 
jo Third, the composite limited-life model assumes that 
Ij millions of AT&T Communications1 diverse assets can be averaged 
jr into a single asset so that the annuity concept can be used, 
jg Long-lived buildings are averaged with short-lived electronic 
17 components. There is no recognition of the fact that the AT&T 
|g Communications telecommunications network involves interrelated 
jo teams of assets, all of which are necessary for the system to 
90 function. The model assumes, contrary to the evidence, that 
2] the income stream will continue regardless of the fact that 
29 necessary elements of the system will be retired before the end 
23 of the assumed composite average life. Composite life is a 
24 meaningless mathematical manipulation. It is not supported by 
25 any academic quality appraisal literature or any literature 
2(j other than that authored by the Board. The result has no 
27 relation to reality and sheds no light on value. The composite 
2g life method violates proper appraisal methodology and Pule 8, 
1 Fourth, the Board's modified-capitalized-income approach 
2 assumes that the regulated utility taxpayer keeps the entire 
3 benefit of accelerated depreciation. The modified capitalized 
4 income approach is the second of two limited-life computations 
5 that the Board does. The modified calculation uses a so-called 
g J factor by which the income valuations are increased to take 
7 account of the benefit that the Board assumes the utility 
g taxpayer will derive from electing accelerated depreciation, 
g The mechanics of the modified calculation is to decrease the 
|Q federal income tax component of the Board's capitalization rate 
jj and in consequence to increase the calculated value. 
j2 Regulated utility taxpayers are required to elect a 
13 system of accounting under which a deferred income tax reserve 
24 is created. This reserve is deducted from rate base. The 
25 effect of the deduction is to pass all the cash flow benefit of 
2g the election of accelerated depreciation through to the 
17 consumer in the form of lower rates. The assumption upon which 
2g the Board's modified-capitalized-earnings approach is based is 
29 wrong as respects AT&T Communications/ a regulated utility. It 
20 would be wrong for any regulated utility under a similar system 
2| of accounting, and it would be wrong for any purchaser of the 
22 assets of AT&T Communications on the evidence here, as 
23 regulation of those assets would continue on the same basis. 
24 The Board's assumption that AT&T Communications retains the 
25 entire benefit of accelerated depreciation is wrong. 
2(j The Board has requested specific findings on the 
27 components of its composite limited-life model. The level of 
23 income capitalized by the Board is incorrect. The Board's 
1 add-back of depreciation with no deduction for capital 
2 expenditures erroneously inflates the income capitalized and 
3 also inflates the resulting value. 
4 The Board's basic capitalization rate is incorrect. The 
g basic rate is the average of the cost of debt and cost of 
g equity, weighted in accordance with an assumed capital 
7 structure. The Board's cost of equity determination, an 
g essential element of the basic capitalization rate, at 11.25 
g percent was not explained by any witness. The determination is 
jQ far below prior and contemporaneous determinations of cost of 
H equity made by the CPUC and FCC. These costs of equity 
12 determinations represent the regulatory assessment of current 
jo capital costs. Mr. Hendrick admitted that the Board-determined 
14 capitalization rate assumes that the hypothetical investor 
|c would accept less than the regulatory rate of return. The 
jg evidence does not support that assumption. The Board's 11.25 
17 percent determination is also far below the cost of equity 
jo determinations of 15.0 percent and 15.2 percent reached by 
19 plaintiffs' witnesses. It is even further below the 17.0 
90 percent cost of equity figure of its outside appraisers. The 
91 Court finds the Board's cost of equity is in error. As the 
22 Board's cost of equity is in error, the basic capitalization 
23 rate derived from the cost of equity is also in error. 
91 The Board's cost of debt at 9.375 percent is an accurate 
25 estimate of lien date cost of debt for Aa rated utility bonds, 
og The Board's problem here is that the Board has assigned too 
27 great a percentage in the plaintiffs' assumed capital structure 
90 for debt. Unless the debt portion of the capital structure is 
-?4-
1 reduced, the bonds may not be Aa rated and the debt cost would 
2 increase. The Court cannot find that, with the Board's assumed 
3 capital structure, the Board's cost of debt is an accurate 
4 estimate. 
5 The Board's capital recapture component in its 
g capitalization rate is derived, as explained, from the Board's 
7 estimate of the composite remaining life of the assets and the 
g basic capitalization rate. The Court has already found that 
g the 14-year composite remaining life is wrong and that the 
10 basic capitalization rate is wrong. The capital recapture 
ii component therefore is also wrong. 
19 Another issue presented by the capital recapture 
jg component computation is whether the Board should employ a 
24 sinking fund component, as it did for plaintiffs, or a straight 
15 line component. For four railroad taxpayers, the Board employs 
jg a straight line capital recovery component. The Board has a 
17 form for the straight-line method: "Form V-557 Rev.8." 
jg (PI.Ex. 139.) The substitution of a straight-line factor for a 
in sinking-fund factor in the capitalization rate radically 
20 increases the capitalization rate and reduces the resulting 
21 capitalized earnings value indicator. For example, with a 
22 14-year life, the sinking-fund factor is .0326 and the 
23 straiaht-line factor is .0714. Use of a straight-line factor 
24 increases both the capital recovery component and the tax 
25 component of the capitalization rate. The combined effect in 
26 this example adds approximately eight percentage points to the 
27 capitalization rate. For plaintiffs, substituting an eith-year 
23 life (the life used in 1987) and the straight line factor for 
j the sinking-fund factor reduces capitalized earnings values by 
2 a total of 37-39 percent. 
3 The straight-line method (which carries with it the 
^ assumption that the income declines annually) better fits the 
g pattern of declining income from the decreasing rate base a 
g utility such as AT&T Communications would experience if its 
^ assets were considered to be frozen in place as of the lien 
g date, (TR. 1486; 3029.) The composite limited-life model is 
g wrong, whether a sinking fund or a straight line factor is used 
jQ in the capitalization rate. The use of the straight line 
jj factor mitigates the error, however, and at a minimum should 
22 have been used by the Board for these taxpayers. Board 
|o witnesses did not explain how the taxpayers were selected for 
14 whom the straight-line factor is employed. The determination 
15 appeared to be arbitrary ("division policy"). (TR. 1481.) 
jg Mr. Hendrick suggested that the capital recovery factor should 
47 match the capital recovery practices of a prospective 
18 purchaser. But all state-assessed utilities, including 
10 plaintiffs, employ straight-line depreciation, and straight-
9Q line depreciation is used uniformly under regulation, according 
2i to Mr. Hendrick. 
90 The Board's capital recovery component of its model 
23 purports to provide for a return of investment by adding a 
24 factor to the capitalization rate that is the mathematical 
25 equivalent of a sinking fund factor even though the Board 
2G explained that it does not assume a sinking fund method of 
07 capital recovery. The value result is the same, however. The 
90 recovery of investment bas^d en a sinking fund assumption has 
- ^ b -
j been rejected by the courts. See Burlington Northern, Inc. v. 
2 Department of Revenue 291 Or. 729, 635 P.2d 347 (1981); Pacific 
3 Power & Light v. Department of Revenue 286 Or. 529, 596 P.2d 
4 912 (1979); Burlington Northern Railroad v. Department of 
5 Revenue U.S.D.C., Western Dist. of Washington, No. C85-767T 
g (October 25, 1985, Order Granting Preliminary Injunction); Soo 
7 Line R. Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue 89 Wis.2d 331, 
3 278 N.W.2d 487, aff'd, 97 Wis.2d 56, 292 N.W.2d 869 (1980). 
9 The Board's Cost Approach. The Board's use of HCLD 
IQ (without deduction of the accumulated deferred income taxes) as 
|i a cost approach value indicator is based on the assumption that 
jo the regulatory authority would permit a prospective purchaser 
13 t o write UP rate base to reflect the elimination of deferred 
jj income tax reserve upon sale. If this assumption were not 
j5 true, Mr. Hendrick admitted, HCLD should not be used as a value 
jg indicator. The Board offered no evidence to support the 
17 assumption. Mr. Long testified unequivocally that the CPUC 
jg would not permit property to be sold back and forth between 
jg utilities to inflate rate base. He agreed that rate base would 
on n o t increase because of a transfer for cash in which the seller 
2J had to pay off the deferred taxes. Both Mr. O'Rouke and 
22 Mr. Long stated that the purchaser of utility property would 
23 take the rate base of seller. Mr. Hendrick also conceded that 
24 the further away HCLD is from rate base, the less reliable HCLD 
25 
27 
is as a market value indicator. The Court finds that the 
2(j Board's assumption is wrong, 
The Court has set forth in detail instances where Board 
2S C.F sumptions? are wrong. Inherent in some of these assumptions 













are errors of law. The Board has also committed other errors 
of law as hereinafter set forth. 
311 The Board's Limited Life Model. Board Rule 8(c) 
A\ requires that "capital expenditures (or annual allowances 
g therefore) required to develop and maintain the estimated 
g income" must be deducted in computing the "net return" to be 
y\\ capitalized. The Board's method of capitalizing income by 
o adding back depreciation and making no allowance for capital 
g expenditures violates the rule. The Board must subtract future 
replacement costs necessary to maintain the income from the 
lien date assets. Even in computing a limited-life model under 
Rule 8(b), the Board must comply with the definition of net 
return to be capitalized set out in Rule 8(c). The Board's 
model assumes an income stream that declines in reality, 
contrary to Rule 8(c) that specifies an income stream that is 
"maintained." 
The Board's add-back of depreciation to income to be 
capitalized without recognition of necessary reinvestment for 
cable, switches, and other plant, creates the illusion of a 
systematic, annual recapture of investment, liquidating the 
utility. This cannot happen under the existing system of 






proper, adequate communications services. There would 
necessarily be regulatory intervention if AT&T Communications 
actually began to liquidate, along the lines of the Board's 
26 composite limited-life model. 
This implicit assumption behind the composite 
limited-life model, as determined by the Board, is that the 
-28-
enterprise will not necessarily operate beyond the composite 
remaining life of the pool of assets. Instead, the Board's 
assumption is that it is only necessary to return to investors 
their investment in the pool of assets over the limited period 
of time that the assets are assumed to provide income. The 
assets are assumed to function and produce income without 
recognition of required capital replacements. No provision is 
made for replacements that are necessary to maintain the rate 
base and related income stream. None of these assumptions are 
justified on the evidence before the Court. The AT&T 
Communications system is an interdependent network. It would 
cease to function long before the Board's assumed composite 
life was reached as essential categories of plant dropped out 
of service. The composite limited-life model is contrary to 
reality. 
The Board's add-back of depreciation and failure to 
deduct capital expenditures dramatically increases the value 
result by that step alone. When net operating income after 
taxes is capitalized at the Board's basic rate, on comparable 
assumptions, values below the Court's values result. Even the 
addition back of taxes to net operating income and the addition 
in the capitalization rate of a tax factor does not increase 
value that much. When the Board adds back depreciation and 
capitalizes gross cash flow with no provision for replacements, 
the capitalized income value explodes, entirely from the 
Board's manipulating the numbers. This one step takes 
capitalized income value from $523,737,090 to $1,195,662,724 
for AT&T California and from $7,449,378,564 to $12,355,647,596 
for AT&T Interstate. 
2 Mr. Hendrick, the Board's expert, recognized that the 
2 Board's composite limited-life model will always produce a 
3 higher value result than a perpetual life model. This occurs 
4 even though the limited-life model values the lien date assets 
5 while the perpetual life model values the lien date assets and 
g all their successors. The lien date assets alone, plainly, 
^ should be worth less not more than these assets and their 
g successors. The model invariably produces inflated income 
o value estimates. When a valuation method invariably results in 
JQ a higher valuation, the error is not a mere matter of appraisal 
jj opinion; the method is wrong as a matter of law. See Matter of 
22 Southern Railway (1985) 313 N.C. 177, 328 S.E.2d 235, 239. 
23 The Board's method capitalizes gross cash flow, contrary 
j j to the settled principle from the academic and professional 
2jJ financial literature, and Rule 8(c), that provides only net 
jg cash flow, cash flow after deduction of necessary capital 
27 expenditures, is to be capitalized. Mr. Jackson conceded the 
lg Board does not capitalize net cash flow. 
jq The Court is not ruling that Board Rule 8 requires the 
on use of a perpetual life model. The Rule permits the use of a 
91 limited-life model if appropriate to the assets under 
99 appraisal. There are limited-life models other than the 
2Q Board's model. Mr. Hendrick, the Board's expert, conceded that 
24 if capital expenditures were required to maintain the assumed 
limited-life income stream — a fact the Court finds to be 
true — the Board could not use its limited-life model, 
27II although some other limited-life model might be used. He also 





j expenditures in other limited-life models. The Board's 
2 composite limited-life model, as applied to these taxpayers on 
g the evidence before the Court, is invalid as a matter of law. 
4 The Board's composite limited-life model on this evidence does 
g not comply with Rule 8(c). 
g Interest on debt is erroneously assumed under the 
7 Board's composite limited-life model to remain constant. In 
g fact, the interest deduction necessarily decreases as debt is 
g paid down under the capital recovery assumptions of the model. 
The Board has concluded that no reinvestment of the annual 
Ij II capital recovery it proposes is required. In consequence, the 
22 utility owner must repay the debt portion of the capital 
13 recovery. Once that occurs, the interest deduction declines, 
14 tax payments increase, and the remaining amount of cash flow is 
j5 insufficient to provide the required return on capital and 
jg return of capital. The cash flow after tax needed for these 
17 purposes is therefore not constant and will continue to decline 
jg in accelerating fashion. It is impossible both to pay the 
jg assumed return and to recovery all of the invested capital 
20 under the Board's assumptions. 
21 The tax factor therefore should reflect increasing 
22 taxes. Instead, the Board's tax factor understates tax 
23 expense. The Board's tax factor thereby creates artificial 
24 inflated values. This is a structural flaw in the Board's 
25 model that invalidates it as a matter of law for any taxpayer 
26 t o w^OIT1 it ^s applied. 
27 Working capital is intangible property that is not 
2g taxable. See Board Rule 8(e); Roehm v. County of Orange (1948) 
32 Cal.2d 280. Rule 8(e) provides xn part: 
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1 "When income from operating a property is 
used [in capitalization], sufficient income 
2 shall be excluded to provide a return on 
working capital and other nontaxable 
3II operating assets and to compensate unpaid 
























The Board's deduction for working capital*is 
understated. Since the Board is dealing with a before-tax 
income stream, a sufficient amount of income must be excluded 
on a before-tax basis to comply with Rule 8(e). The exclusion 
should be determined by multiplying the amount of working 
capital by a factor which includes the Board's basic 
capitalization rate and tax factor. An insufficient amount is 
provided by the Board, which uses the basic capitalization rate 
only. The Board's model thereby violates the standards 
prescribed by law, specifically the Board's own Rule 8(e). 
Mr. Hendrick stated that the Board justifies the 
inadequate exclusion by assuming that all utility income is 
attributable to the tangible assets only, not the intangible 
assets, although he could not say if this assumption is 
correct. This assumption is wrong. Working capital is part of 
rate base; the utility is entitled to earn the same return on a 
dollar of working capital as on any other component of rate 
base. 
The Board's capitalization income value is logically 
impossible. The Board's assumed cash flow cannot be maintained 
on any given set of facts. If capital expenditures are made, 
the cash flow stream will be far lower than that the Board 
capitalizes. If capital expenditures are not made, the cash-





j The Board's composite limited-life model assumptions are 
2 factually erroneous. The model violates the standards 
g prescribed by law, specifically the Board's own Rule 8(c). It 
^ is not validated by academic appraisal literature or by the 
g testimony of any outside expert witness in this trial. It 
g contradicts the behavior and expectations of prospective buyers 
j \ \ and sellers of utility property and has no relation to the 
g reality of operation of a regulated utility enterprise. As the 
g Court noted in Soo Line R. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Revenue 
(1980) 89 Wis.2d 331, 341, 278 N.W.3d 487, 492, aff'd, 97 
Wis.2d 56, 292 N.W.2d 869: "The ultimate test of a [valuation] 
IQII formula is whether it bears a reasonable relation to reality . 
•jo . . .M The Board's composite limited-life model bears no 
I J reasonable relation to reality. 
jr Cost Approach. The Board's cost approach violates the 
jg standards prescribed by law, specifically the Board's own 
j7 Rule 3(d). The Rule states that if HCLD is used as rate base 
18 ky t^ie r e <? ul a t o ry agency, it may be used by the taxing agency 
jo as a value indicator. The Board seeks to use HCLD as a value 
20 indicator but concedes that the regulatory agency does not use 
HCLD as rate base. The accumulated deferred income tax reserve 
which is deducted to reach rate base must also be deducted to 
23 J J compute any valid cost indicator. 
24 Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State Board of 
25 Equalization (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 938, 957 recently held that 
2Q if the regulatory agency did not use HCLD as a rate base, "the 
27 condition precedent" to the use of HCLD as a value indicator 




j method of valuation. The Board's cost indicator violates this 
2 holding. 
3 In conclusion, the Court reiterates that the defendants 
J grossly overvalued plaintiffs' property. The methods of 
5 valuation it used were not those which were likely to arrive at 
g the fair market value of plaintiffs' property and were not 
7 those that would be used by knowledgeable and realistic buyers 
g and sellers. One of the primary factors either a knowledgeable 
g and realistic buyer or seller would have to consider is whether 
JQ the purchase could be financed. In making this determination, 
11 they would necessarily take into account that the public 
22 Utilities to be sold are regulated utilities with a fixed rate 
jg of return on rate base, and that it is highly unlikely that 
14 said companies would be deregulated in the foreseeable future, 
j5 if ever. The most reasonable and realistic method of valuation 
|g under such circumstances is the income method, where a 
17 reasonable estimate of future earnings is made and those 
jg earnings are capitalized by a reasonable and realistic cost of 
19 capital. The values set by the Court are reasonable and 
20 realistic and are supported by the evidence, whereas the values 
21 assigned by the Board to plaintiffs for 1986 are not, as they 
22 3o not comport with the realities of regulation or the 
23 investment marketplace. 
24 DATED: j l\\^t% J <i ' / '/'// / 
2G 
27 Judxfr* of t h e S u p e r i o r Ccfcprt 
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ADDENDUM C 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
NORTHWEST PIPELINE CORPORATION, 
: FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Petitioner, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND FINAL DECISION 
v. ) 
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF THE : Appeal No. 85-0074 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, ) and 86-0255 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
(Tax Commission) for Informal Hearing for the 1985 and 1986 tax 
years, on May 12, 1987. Commissioners Hansen, Tew, Pacheco and 
Davis heard the matter. Mark K. Buchi represented the 
Petitioner and Maxwell A. Miller represented the Respondent. 
Also present on behalf of the Petitioner were David Schenk, Dr. 
John Davis, and Dr. Hal Heaton. Present for the Respondent 
were Eckhardt Prawitt, Michael Goodwin, and Dr. James 
Ifflander. Bill Thomas Peters appeared representing the 
various counties affected by the outcome of this decision. 
Appeal Nos. 85-0074 and 86-0255 
Petitioner is a wholly owned subsidiary of Northwest 
Energy Company which in turn is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the Williams Company. The Petitioner owns and operates a 
natural gas pipeline system serving customers in seven western 
states including Utah. The unit valuation approach is being 
applied to Petitioner's property. The allocation factors used 
to allocate a portion of the total pipeline system to Utah are 
not in dispute. 
The Respondent had concluded that the total unit value 
of the Petitioner's pipeline systems for the years 1985 and 
1986 were $900,000,000 and $1,100,000,000 respectively. For 
1985, 18.23% of the total system was allocated to Utah, and for 
1986, 16.86% was allocated to Utah. Petitioner's objections to 
each assessment year were timely filed. The parties have 
agreed that the issues presented are identical for each of the 
two tax years. 
The issues raised are as follows: 
1. In the income indicator of value, are the values 
attributable to growth expectations properly accounted for by 
the parties in their respective appraisals; whether or not the 
proper definition and projection of cash flow in the future has 
been properly computed; and the applicability of direct vs. 
yield capitalization methods? 
2. What is the appropriate calculation for the stock 
.and debt indicator of value? 
3. Should intangible and other non-assessable 
property values be deducted from the system value? 
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4. What is the proper adjustment, if any, for 
obsolescence in the cost indicator of value? 
5. Should the fair market value of the Petitionees 
property be reduced by 20% pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-5-4.5? 
The parties presented their respective appraisals and 
expert witnesses in support of their arguments and contentions 
as it relates to the above referenced issues. 
Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the 
Tax Commission makes the following findings of facts and 
conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner owns and operates a multi-state, 
integrated gas pipeline system, a portion of which is located 
in and subject to taxation by the State of Utah. The 
allocation or proportion figures used by the Respondent are not 
disputed by the Petitioner. 
2. The tax years in question are the property tax 
assessment years of 1985 and 1986. 
3. Petitioner is subject to regulation by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Petitioner is 
regulated by FERC in functionally the same manner that state 
utilities are regulated by the Utah Public Service Commission. 
COST INDICATOR OF VALUE 
4. In the rate making process, FERC adjusts the net 
book value of the Petitioner's property for deferred federal 
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income taxes (DFIT) to arrive at an allowable rate base upon 
which Petitioner is allowed to earn a rate of return. An 
informed investor would not be willing to pay full cost as 
measured by net book value for Petitioner's operating system 
because that amount exceeds the value of the rate base upon 
which the investor would be allowed to earn. Therefore, the 
net book value should be reduced by the amount: of the DFIT in 
accordance with the FERC practice . 
5. The position of the Petitioner is that the cost 
indicator of value should be reduced for economic obsolescence 
which has occurred because the Petitioner will actually earn 
less than the FERC allowed rate of return. However, the 
established rate by FERC does not guarantee that Petitioner 
will actually earn at that level. The evidence indicates that 
in recent years Petitioner has consistently earned less than 
its allowable rate of return. No evidence was introduced 
regarding what factors caused the reduction in Petitioner's 
income. Therefore, we find the reduction in the earnings of 
Petitioner is not due to factors external to the property 
itself and as a consequence does not result in any economic 
obsolescence to be deducted from the cost indicator of value. 
INCOME INDICATOR OF VALUE 
6. Yield capitalization and direct capitalization 
are both acceptable methods for the income indicator of value 
insofar as the principles involved are consistently applied and 
supported by competent evidence. 
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7, In direct capitalization of income, the value is 
calculated by dividing the next years projected income by a 
rate that is derived from an earnings/price ratio. The formula 
is V = I/R. In yield capitalization, the value is calculated 
by dividing a series of cash flows by_a rate that includes 
growth. The formula is V = CF/K. 
These two formulas are not the same because the 
elements are different. The K in yield capitalization is 
typically calculated with the formula K = D/P + G where D = 
dividends, P = price and G = the growth factor. A 
substantial difference in the two methods is that in direct 
capitalization no growth is included in the rate, but in yield 
capitalization, growth is included. If the principles are 
correctly applied, each of the methods should arrive at 
approximately similar conclusions. The Petitioner has misused 
the yield capitalization method by dividing an income stream 
which does not include growth by a rate which does include 
growth. As a result the Petitioner's income indicator of value 
is understated. 
8. In direct capitalization, the approach used by 
the Respondent, the comparables used to develop an 
earnings/price ratio are sufficiently comparable to warrant use 
of that ratio. In addition, Petitioner did not provide 
convincing evidence that the use of the direct capitalization 
method was inappropriate or inaccurate. 
9. The Petitioner also misapplied the income 
approach to value by: (a) attributing a portion of the value to 
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"intangibles", whereas, in the unit concept of value the entire 
earning entity is deemed to be tangible property subject to 
taxation, (b) using a declining income stream when the evidence 
indicates the income would likely continue to increase, (c) 
using data from non-comparable companies, and (d) including a 
growth factor in the numerator of the formula used in 
calculating the yield capitalization rate. 
STOCK AND DEBT APPROACH 
10. The stock and debt indicator of value is 
difficult to apply to the Petitioner. Petitioner is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the Williams Company, a privately owned, 
non-public corporation. The parent corporation raises capital 
by the issuance of its own debt and that capital is then 
utilized in the business operations of The Williams Company and 
its several subsidiaries, including Petitioner. Therefore, it 
is very difficult to determine what portion of the stock and 
debt of The Williams Company should be allocated to 
Petitioner. Further, there is no specific information 
available concerning the market value of the non-public stock. 
Because of the difficulties associated with accurately 
allocating a portion of the equity value of the parent 
company's non-publicly traded stock to Petitioners, two tiers 
down, we find that the stock and debt indicator is the least 
reliable of the three traditional indicators and will be given 
little, if any, weight. 
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MISCELLANEOUS FINDINGS 
11. Tangible assets are worth more in the aggregate 
as a going concern than as discrete and insular objects. 
However, the Tax Commission does not find the argument of the 
Petitioners persuasive that the added value is an intangible 
which is not taxable. The Commission would recognize a 
deduction for an intangible where that intangible can be 
removed, separated from the going concern, quantified, valued 
and (theoretically) sold. No convincing evidence was presented 
of such an intangible amount. 
12. The Tax Commission does not accept the theory of 
valuation as espoused by the Petitioner, i.e., that the income 
stream will decline predictably. This assumption is incorrect 
in that it does not comport with the basic principals of 
finance and valuation and it understates cash flows and 
mismatches income to capitalization rates. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 provides for a 20% 
reduction from the market values for residential, industrial 
and commercial real property appraised by county assessors. 
The 20% reduction does not extend to nor does it apply to 
centrally assessed property such as that of the Petitioner. 
Rio Algom Corporation v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184. 
2. The Tax Commission can neither declare 59-5-5.4 
unconstitutional because it does not give a 20% reduction to 
centrally assessed property nor extend the coverage of the 
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section to centrally assessed property. Shea v. State Tax 
Commission, 120 P.2d 274, Utah 1941. 
3. The use of the unitary method of valuation meets 
the requirement of Article XIII, Sections 2 & 3 of the Utah 
Constitution. The unitary method correctly assumes that the 
value of the entire system as a going concern is greater than 
the total fair market value of its equipment appraised as 
discrete and insular parts, Western Airlines Inc. v. 
Michunovich, 428 P.2d 3 (1967). Any so called intangible 
components of the tangible assets resulting from assemblage as 
a going concern are due to synergy, and are therefore not 
separately identifiable for valuation purposes. No evidence 
was presented at the hearing which would properly identify 
intangible values which could be deducted from the going 
concern value. Based on the foregoing the Commission concludes 
that: 
4. The cost indicator of value is $773,000,000 for 
1985, and $805,000,000 for 1986, the income indicator of value 
is $871,000,000 for 1985 and $1,114,000 for 1986, and the stock 
and debt indicator of value is $850,000,000 for 1985 and 
$983,000,000 for 1986. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of facts and 
conclusions of law, it is the Decision and Order of the Utah 
State Tax Commission that the value of the subject property for 
ad valorem property tax purposes for the tax year 1985 is 
$840,000,000 and for tax year 1986 is $1,055,000,000. 
Appeal Nos. 85-0074 and 86-0255 
It is therefore the order of the Utah State Tax 
Commission that the assessment of the Respondent is affirmed 
part. The Respondent is ordered to adjust its cost indicator 
of value to reflect a reduction for deferred federal income 
taxes and the final conclusion of value as determined by the 
Tax Commission. + 
DATED this J2J^ day of /\>c lejrnlpAJ . 1987. 





G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: It is hereby given that you have 30 days from the 
date of mailing of this decision to appeal to the Tax Court 
or the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
JEH/lgh/5239w 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, certify that on March 19, 1991, I served four copies of the Initial Brief 
of Petitioner, Questar Pipeline Company, by first class mail upon counsel for respon-
dent in this matter to the following address: 
Paul Van Dam, Attorney General 
Kelly W. Wright, Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney General's Office 
Suite 1100 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
